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Preface and acknowledgements 
 
Sir Humphrey Appleby: 
“My job is to carry out government policy.” 
 
James Hacker 
“Even if you think it’s wrong?” 
 
Sir Humphrey Appleby: 
“Well, almost all government policy is wrong. But frightfully well carried out.” 
 
-Yes, Minster S03E06: "The Whisky Priest". 
 
I know I may now risk treading dangerously close to, if not over, a certain line. A line 
which marks the distinction between objective scholarly reflections and personal 
political opinion. However, I feel it strangely pertinent to describe the 2014-2020 
Norwegian Local Government Reform, and the 2015-2020 Regional Government 
Reform processes as a government sticking its hand into a hornet’s nest, shaking it 
vigorously, unleashing a belligerent swarm of latent historical, political, and societal 
cleavages, only to back away before reaping the promised spoils while acting as if they 
were never stung. 
 
The two reforms are historic in their scope. They have altered decades- and centuries-
old municipal and county structures and devolved a range of government competences. 
Despite this, they have also yielded fewer results than the reformers envisioned. The 
reforms have, since their inception, rested on shaky foundations. Though initially based 
on a historically large parliamentary support, it dwindled into non-existence throughout 
the process. Their opponents have surged to historic poll and election results. And 
despite their implementation in 2020, opposition at local, regional, and national levels 
have remained determined to reverse them. And so, it remains to be seen whether the 
reforms will stick, or become, as similar reform attempts have in times past, just another 
chapter in the ever-lurking, never-settled, and volatile debate on the optimal architecture 
of Norway’s subnational governments. 
 
This Ph.D. thesis is a part of the Norwegian Research Council funded project 
“Reshaping the Map of Local and Regional Self-Government. A study of the Norwegian 
Local Government Reform (NLGR) processes 2014-2019”. The project has been headed 
by professor Yngve Flo, who has also taken the role as one of my supervisors in this 
Ph.D.1 The purpose of the project has been to study the Norwegian Local and Regional 
Government Reform processes, from their inception in 2014/2015, to their 
implementation on 1 January 2020. To the project, my thesis has contributed with 
knowledge of the regional level and the regional reform, as well as the county governors’ 
role in the local reform. From the project, it has benefitted from already collected 
 
1 Flo is a professor at the Department of Archaeology, History, Cultural Studies and Religion, 
University of Bergen. At the start of the research project, he headed the project as lead researcher at 
the research institute Uni Research Rokkansenteret (which was reorganised to the Norwegian 
Research Centre, NORCE). 
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interview data of the county governors. Though the project technically ended with the 
reforms’ implementation, this thesis has extended the project period, and as such acts as 
a final contribution to it. 
 
I have long had an interest in the subnational. This interest grew and strengthened during 
my time at the University of Bergen. In my master thesis in Comparative Politics, I 
studied the Regional Government Reform. As luck would have it, I was from there able 
to jump straight into a Ph.D. and continue to sate my curiosity. From the offices at 
NORCE, The Norwegian Research Centre, this thesis has been undertaken in 
collaboration with the University of Bergen. Naturally, therefore, there are several 
people to thank from both places. 
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my main supervisor, prof. Anne Lise Fimreite. 
Her guidance, inputs and contributions have been invaluable throughout this process. I 
have always found myself eager to jump right back to work fresh with ideas and 
solutions to problems I encountered along the way. 
I also thank my co-supervisors, profs. Michaël Tatham and Yngve Flo. Tatham was my 
supervisor when writing my bachelor thesis as well, and both from his lectures as well 
as meetings to discuss papers and data, he has always kept increasing my interest in 
studying the subnational levels. Flo was the concrete reason I got this opportunity in the 
first place, as he headed the research project in which a Ph.D. position opened. He has 
also contributed with important historical perspectives and knowledge concerning 
reforms; not to mention the bountiful data ripe for analysis he provided me on my very 
first day. 
 
As for my colleagues at NORCE, my research group Public Sector Innovation deserves 
special thanks. First, I would like to thank Tord Linden for being an excellent group 
leader, always available and able to help with anything and everything. I would also like 
to thank all the other members of the research group, both previous and current. The bar 
has always been low for presenting my work and receiving excellent feedback, which 
has helped a great deal throughout this process. 
 
Finally, I would also like to thank the other PhDs at the Comparative Politics department 
for the wonderful gatherings at Solstrand (and Zoomstrand). Discussing with and 
receiving feedback from others ‘in the same boat’ is an invaluable asset. 
 
I don’t know how many start out as a student with the goal of one day completing a 
Ph.D. I certainly didn’t. But I am tremendously grateful I have been given the 
opportunity to do so – if not only for the sake of contributing new knowledge to a field 
one has a passion for, then at least for the many wonderful people one gets to meet, and 








The Norwegian 2014-2020 Local Government Reform, and the 2015-2020 Regional 
Government Reform reduced the number of municipalities from 428 to 356, the number 
of counties from 19 to 11, and transferred some political and administrative tasks from 
the national level to the local and regional levels. The two reforms contained both 
voluntary and coerced dynamics, where especially the latter was (and continues to be) 
the subject of controversy and debate. Reforms that amalgamate governments and 
decentralise tasks intricately involve the administrative sphere in the affected 
institutions. The effects of such reforms are often measured based on administrative 
changes. Literature relating to such reforms has followed trends of amalgamation and 
decentralisation reforms since the 1970s. What has remained relatively unknown, 
however, is administrative dynamics at play during such reforms. 
 
In acknowledging that administrators play a role not only as implementors, but also 
shapers and contributors of policy, an important question has therefore lingered: what 
sort of behaviour can we observe among administrators undergoing, and involved in, 
significant institutional changes that amalgamation and decentralisation bring? 
 
In this thesis, I study the regional administrative sphere during two of the most contested 
public sector reforms in Norway of the last few decades. In three individual research 
papers, I measure and analyse regional administrators’ preferences towards coerced 
territorial amalgamation and decentralisation, and decision-making of municipal 
territorial structures by elite administrators. The three papers are connected through an 
overarching informative and interpretive framework of rescaling. The papers utilise rich 
survey and interview data, and subsequently involve both quantitative and qualitative 
methods for analysing them. 
 
The findings show that the rescaling framework can help us to understand the 
preferences and decisions among regional administrators involved in rescaling reforms. 
But as the rescaling phenomenon is multifaceted, so too are the findings. 
Administrators’ preferences and decisions are driven by arguments of functionality as 
well as issues of community and identity – but it depends on the particular form of 
rescaling. 
 
The findings contribute to the rescaling literature by demonstrating how the logics of 
rescaling mobilise preferences in the administrative sphere. It also contributes to our 
understanding of the factors that drive preferences and behaviour among administrators 
generally, and our understanding of regional administrators specifically. By focusing on 
the various procedural dynamics (coercion and voluntary amalgamation) it also 
demonstrates the type of rationalisation that increase support for controversial policies. 
This is important to know, as these administrators were not only involved in shaping the 
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Rescaling the architecture of government has once again entered the fray (though it 
perhaps never left (Bolgherini, Casula and Marotta 2018)) as a solution to confront a 
variety of challenges. In Europe, we currently find ourselves in the third and (so far) 
latest wave of rescaling reforms in which many governments seem to see territorial 
consolidation2 and decentralisation as solutions to improve public service provision, and 
to increase, mobilise, and promote economic development and competitiveness from 
below. This is partly seen as a response to the 2008 financial crisis (Xu and Warner 
2015, Bolgherini, Casula and Marotta 2018, 448). 
Among the most recently implemented rescaling reforms in this latest wave are 
the Norwegian 2014-2020 Local Government Reform, and the 2015-2020 Regional 
Government Reform. The reforms have reduced the number of municipalities from 428 
to 356, the number of counties from 19 to 11. Some political and administrative tasks 
have also been transferred from the national level to the local and regional levels. 
Though historic in their scope, the reforms have continually rested on shaky 
foundations. Parliamentary support has shifted over time, and opposition at local, 
regional, and national levels have expressed a desire to reverse the reforms if given the 
chance. 
Beyond securing support for reform, changing the architecture of government is 
fraught with potential pitfalls. And there is no guarantee of its theorised effects, which, 
under the current rescaling wave, have mainly been said to be to reduce costs, optimise 
public service delivery, and rationalise decision-making processes (Swianiewicz, 
Gendzwil and Zardi 2017, 3). Effects of rescaling reforms are mostly measured in the 
administrative sphere (Dhimitri 2018, Tavares 2018).3 If imposed from above, the 
reforms may (also) upset local communities and identities, and invoke questions related 
to (local) democracy and legitimacy of decision-making processes. Desires for local 
 
2 “Territorial consolidation” may also be labelled “amalgamation”, or “mergers”, (De Vries and Sobis 
2014). they all describe the process of combining two or more government units into a larger one. I 
use these terms interchangeably in this thesis. 
3 Rescaling reforms may also be undertaken with the aim of improving conditions for local 
democracy, but studies claim that such an effect is ambivalent or adverse  (Ebinger, Kuhlmann and 
Bogumil 2018, Erlingsson, Ödalen and Wångmar 2020, Swianiewicz, Gendzwil and Zardi 2017).3 
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self-rule4, individual rights, and even human rights have also been claimed to be at odds 
with such coercion (Erlingsson, Ödalen and Wångmar 2020). 
Digging further into this topic, we may ask some stage-setting questions. Namely, 
if a reform is initiated at one level and implemented at another, what does it take to 
achieve its envisioned goals and effects? When such effects are intended to come from 
the administrative sphere, what do administrators – having to live in and with the new 
structures they themselves implement – value? How are structural and institutional 
reforms met by those whose daily lives and work will be affected directly, indirectly, 
short-term, and long-term? Can we expect a reform to reach its intended outcomes if 
those being reformed and responsible for its implementation do not agree to the means, 
or even the necessity of reaching those outcomes in the first place? What sort of 
territorial and administrative structures do these administrators seek? And how is their 
behaviour determined? Packing these questions into a coherent research agenda, I ask 
in this thesis how the rationales of rescaling resonated with Norwegian regional 
administrators undergoing historic institutional reform. My overarching research 
question is the following: 
 
How can we understand behaviour towards territorial and competence rescaling among 
regional administrators involved in such reforms? 
 
Three papers contribute to this question in distinct but related ways. One paper is 
co-authored with profs. Anne Lise Fimreite and Michaël Tatham, while the remaining 
two are solo authored. All three seek to address various aspects of rescaling reform from 
a regional administrative perspective. The three papers’ research questions contribute to 
our understanding of: 
1. Administrative preferences toward coerced territorial amalgamation, 
2. Administrative preferences toward competence decentralisation, and 
3. Administrative decision-making regarding territorial amalgamation. 
 
4 I define the concept of self-rule in this thesis as the ability and extent of a local (or regional) 




Each paper highlights a specific issue related to the two Norwegian reforms. 
What do administrators think of territorial amalgamation and decentralisation coerced 
from above? How are their preferences shaped? When set to shape territorial structures 
themselves, what sort of motivations and strategies underlie the decisions they make? 
The papers employ both quantitative and qualitative methodology with novel 
empirical data. The data consists of a survey of administrators in the county 
governments’ administrations, and in-depth interviews of every county governor. The 
papers contribute to existing literature as well as generate new insights of administrative 
behaviour.  
The first (co-authored) paper, “Understanding Bureaucratic Support for Coerced 
Institutional Change”, examines regional administrators’ preferences toward the 
controversial process of coerced county amalgamations by the central government 
against the regional governments’ wishes. Utilising original survey data of over 1200 
regional administrators, statistical analyses explore the drivers of their preferences 
toward (and during) a highly contentious and controversial process. 
The second paper, “Reserved but Principled – and Sometimes Functional: 
Explaining Decentralisation Preferences Among Regional Bureaucrats”, focuses on the 
transfer of tasks (government competences) from the central to the regional level that 
took place synchronously with the county amalgamations. Using the same data as the 
first paper, paper no. 2 explores the drivers behind the administrators’ viewpoints on 
competence transfers and investigates how various factors affect their ideas about (or 
wish for) extending their task portfolio in nine policy areas. 
The third paper, “Discretionary Manoeuvrability: The Logics Behind 
Administrative Shaping of Territorial Rescaling”, addresses the Local Government 
Reform. The focus is, however, still at the regional level as the paper analyses the county 
governors’ interpretation of core elements of the Local Government Reform, and the 
discretion they utilised when proposing municipal amalgamations in their own counties. 
This paper analyses qualitative interviews conducted with all county governors. It 
focuses on how the logics of rescaling affected the governors’ interpretations and their 
subsequent municipal amalgamation proposals. 
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Related to the three initiating questions presented above, the findings are 
multifaceted. I find that cleavages of functional pressures, as well as feelings of 
community and identity, both matter for the administrators’ behaviour towards rescaling 
processes. But it depends on the type and form of rescaling: 
Regarding territorial rescaling, administrators’ support is dependent on 
arguments of functional legitimization of rescaling. This is the case among both county 
government administrators’ preferences, and among county governors. An administrator 
who supports functional rescaling arguments is more likely to support territorial 
amalgamation, even if such amalgamation is coerced by central authorities. County 
governors acted as nominators of municipal amalgamations. Their proposals varied 
significantly, and among those who were willing to propose amalgamation against local 
interests legitimised their decisions through functional arguments. Arguments of 
community and identity, meanwhile, reduces administrators’ support for amalgamation. 
Likewise, county governors who were more averse (or refused) to propose municipal 
amalgamations against local interests, related their decisions to issues of local 
community, identity, self-rule, and democracy. 
Regarding competence rescaling, administrators are mostly moderate in their 
desire to expand the county government’s managerial portfolio. However, support for 
decentralisation increases when put through arguments of community and identity. 
Specifically, if administrators desire increased regional self-rule, or are highly attached 
to their county, they become more positive towards regionalising competences. 
Relating these findings to the overarching research question, we can understand 
these preferences and decisions through the framework of rescaling. Among regional 
administrators, territorial amalgamation is largely a functional matter. Decentralisation 
is a matter of community and identity at the regional level. But a logic of community 
and identity can also mobilise opposition against territorial amalgamation – at that point, 
it depends on the process (coerced or voluntary) by which the amalgamation is 
undertaken.  The distinction between the logic of functionalism and community/identity 
has been described as a distinction between questions of policy preferences and 
questions of polity preferences, respectively (Hooghe and Marks 2016, 2, Tatham, 
Hooghe og Marks 2021). But for administrators to support rescaling reform, the question 
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of territory (or polity) is a matter of functionalism. The question of decentralisation (or 
policy) is a matter of community/identity. 
Placed in the Norwegian setting, this thesis provides insights into administrative 
preferences and decision-making from a regional governance system characterised as a 
source of public services rather than a territorial manifestation of strong regional 
identity. Observing how arguments of functionality and issues of community and 
identity affect the Norwegian regional administrators’ behaviour, offers novel insights 
into studies of regional governance (Hooghe and Marks 2016, Tatham and Bauer 2021, 
Tatham, Hooghe og Marks 2021). 
But although the Norwegian regional system is distinct, the Local and Regional 
Government Reforms are not unique to Norway, nor are the rationales associated with 
them. Reforming subnational territorial structures and relocating government 
competences are international phenomena, with reform waves occurring every so often. 
Indeed, between 2008 and 2017, municipal amalgamation reforms were underway in 
fifteen European countries  (Swianiewicz 2018). The rationale to undertake such 
reforms are comparable across countries and governance systems (Erlingsson, Ödalen 
and Wångmar 2020). The research undertaken in this thesis, and the insights it has 
yielded, are as such transferable beyond the Norwegian scene. Understanding the 
processes by which such reforms are taken forward, and the administrative sphere’s role 
in them, increases our understanding of rescaling itself. It also increases our 
understanding of what matters to administrators regarding changes to their own 
environments, and regarding the broader architecture of government. 
 
 
1.1 Subject, theme, and scope 
In this thesis, I study administrative behaviour within a theoretical framework of 
rescaling literature. The Norwegian Local Government Reform (from here referred to 
as LGR) and Regional Government Reform (from here RGR) form the cases for this. 
Contained within this description are some assumptions and definitions in need of 
clarification. The first is that the LGR and RGR are complex phenomena. It is possible 
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to classify the reforms in various ways. They may for example be seen as instances of 
public administration reform (Askim, Klausen, et al. 2016) or as territorial reform 
(Swianiewicz 2018). But the reforms contained both administrative, geographical, and 
political elements. Territorial borders were redrawn, which necessitated a reorganisation 
of the affected governments’ political and administrative institutions. Such reforms also 
affect the citizenry, for example through democratic processes and involvement, such 
as the creation of new elected political bodies.5 It may also affect citizens through the 
services that are provided for the new local and regional governments.6 Hence, the LGR 
and RGR are multifaceted reforms which can and should be scrutinised from multiple 
angles. 
In my thesis, I view the LGR and RGR as instances of rescaling reforms. 
Decentralisation is a process in which one changes the scale at which a specific 
competence – fiscal, political, administrative – operates. Territorial amalgamation is a 
process that changes the scale at which a jurisdictional unit – with all its competences – 
operates. 
Rescaling is a category of public sector reform. In the study of such reforms, 
scholars have a choice of subjects. The subjects may be the public (voters), the political, 
and/or the administrative world. Studies of the causes and effects of such reforms often 
point to the administrative sphere. Such studies also commonly take an institutional or 
organisational, rather than individual perspective. By omitting individual-level 
behavioural variation within an administration, such studies (perhaps unintentionally) 
take for granted a homogeneous group of individuals making up the administrations, 
impartial and noninfluential to the reforms they undergo.7 This is perhaps not too 
surprising, given normative expectations of the administrator as merely a politically 
loyal and objective implementer of pre-determined political decisions (K. D. Jacobsen 
 
5 The effects territorial reforms have on quality of local democracy is both theoretically and 
empirically contested (Ebinger, Kuhlmann and Bogumil 2018, Keating 1995, Swianiewicz, 
Gendzwil and Zardi 2017). 
6 Another contested topic is the effect of such reforms on public service quality. See for instance Oates 
(1972), Saito (2008), or Steiner, et al.  (2018). 
7 One problem such an approach has, is for example that the meaning of various effects of rescaling 




2008). However, omitting those whom a reform directly involves, and from where the 
reform’s effects are intended to come, risks leaving a knowledge gap regarding our 
understanding of the reform itself.  
But rescaling reforms, like other public sector reforms, are ultimately choices 
made by politicians and depend on their priorities and goals. So why and how should 
the administrative sphere matter to us? To answer this, it is important to acknowledge a 
basic and central notion in public administration research: administrators are more than 
faceless implementors. They have preferences, they make decisions, contributing not 
only to implementation, but also formulation, shape, and design of policy (Aberbach, 
Putnam and Rockman 1981, Downs 1967, Egeberg and Stigen 2018, Lægreid and Olsen 
1978). 
This somewhat abbreviated description of the administrator’s role is an outcome 
of decades-long scholarly developments of the political-administrative relationship. 
This relationship was initially seen as clear-cut and characterised by strict hierarchy and 
divisions of responsibilities between politicians and administrators, as described in the 
Weberian model of bureaucracy (Demir and Nyhan 2008). A step away from this model 
was the thinking that administrators have individual preferences and attitudes, which in 
turn shape their behaviour (Downs 1967). In addition, due to growing size and 
complexities of the modern state throughout the 20th century, it became clear that 
politicians could not fully control the entire policy cycle or implement their visions and 
ideas alone. Instead, politicians could see fit to delegate some part of the decision-
making process to the administrative sphere, subject to later inspection (Meier 1975, 
Keiser 2010). 
Increasingly, administrators were seen to fill a role of ‘negotiators and 
coordinators’ among policy stakeholders, while also delivering on the policies desired 
by the politicians. The clear distinction between politicians and administrators thus 
faded (if it was ever there) (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981, D. I. Jacobsen 1997). 
An ever more complex machinery of government meant that different administrative 
bureaus could also have different priorities. It could then be the case that administrative 
and political priorities did not correspond, and, consequently, administrators could not 
always be expected to advice (K. D. Jacobsen 2008) or act (Eliassen and Sitter 2008) 
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fully in accordance with the priorities laid down by the politicians. Thus, competing 
models of administrative behaviour were elaborated, such as those viewing the 
administrator as self-maximising (be it regarding their bureau budgets (Niskanen 1971) 
or status (Dunleavy 1991)). 
These insights have created a significant consensus, or a paradigm of research 
(Kuhn 1970) within public administration literature. Contemporary public 
administration research gives the administrative sphere – whether at the organisational 
or individual level – a much greater importance to the political cycle than earlier theories 
posited (Demir and Nyhan 2008, D. I. Jacobsen 1997). 
This is where the relevance of the administrators comes in. Territorial 
amalgamation involves more than just relocating border signs. Significant 
organisational restructuring takes place inside the institutions that amalgamate. It may 
also entail geographically relocating government institutions (and their personnel) to 
new government headquarters. Decentralisation, for those at the ‘receiving end’, 
involves widening one’s managerial portfolio. The organisational changes that follow 
amalgamation and decentralisation may thus entail personnel change, promotions, 
redundancies, etc. Territorial and competence reforms, especially when coupled, thus 
have direct, indirect, short-term, and long-term consequences for the administrations in 
the affected government units. An important aspect of such reforms is therefore also the 
administrators’ willingness to and acceptance for dramatically changing their own 
environments, and the risks, both professional and psychological, that may be associated 
with such changes (Gains and John 2010, F. Ritchie 2014, Takagishi, Sakata and 
Kitamura 2012, Torugsa and Arundel 2017). And for a reform to succeed, especially 
when coerced from above, one depends on the willingness of those affected to comply 
and to make the new institutions work (Afonso and Venâncio 2019, 19). Understanding 
administrators’ behaviour toward such processes may therefore contribute to our 
understanding not only of the reforms themselves, but also provides us with insight of 
internal processes and the longevity and success of the new institutions. 
In the RGR, county governments engaged in negotiations with their respective 
neighbours to assess the prospects of amalgamations. They also provided a list of 
competences they desired from the central level. In these processes, the county 
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government administrations provided expertise and input, thereby shaping the counties’ 
stance on the reform. The many organisational effects the RGR had on the county 
administrations also made the administrators direct stakeholders in the reform. In the 
LGR, the county governors were, in their role as nominators of municipal 
amalgamations, made significant policy-shapers and influencers of the future municipal 
structure. 
Hence, the regional administrators served, and continue to serve, an important 
role in the recent reform processes. Understanding their preferences and decisions is 
therefore an important part in understanding the reforms themselves. It makes up the 
core motivation for my thesis and my overarching research question. 
 
1.1.1 Theme 
After the 2013 general election, a minority coalition government consisting of the 
Conservative Party and the Progress Party was formed.8 The government signalled its 
intent to reform the public sector at all levels. In 2014, the LGR was initiated. In 2015, 
the RGR was initiated.9 The reforms became two of the government’s most controversial 
reforms, sparking debates about central authority versus local autonomy. The local 
territorial structure has seen its greatest geographical alteration since the 1960s, while 
the regional territorial structure has not been changed so dramatically since the 
introduction of monarchical absolutism in the 1660s (Flo 2004). Municipal and county 
amalgamations, mixing voluntary and coercive means, have resulted in contentious 
debates and vocal opposition among citizens and political parties across all government 
levels. 
The government intended to restructure subnational jurisdictions to achieve 
economically ‘robust’ government units, improve administrative capabilities, reduce 
administrative costs, and produce higher quality and more efficient provisions of 
services to the citizens (Government platform 2013, 2018). In the RGR, they have 
expressly targeted administrators and the administrations, most notably by intending 
 
8 From hence referred to as “the Solberg government”, “the central government”, or simply “the 
government” where it does not cause confusion. 
9 The specific layout of the reforms and their various stages are further laid out in sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
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size reduction, streamlining, and relocation of administrative (and political) personnel 
due to the county amalgamations (White paper 22 (2015-2016) 2016). However, the 
reforms’ legacies are uncertain. To both the local and regional levels, competences have 
been allocated, though the number competences that were decentralised was watered 
down compared to earlier proposals. Though the reforms were implemented fully on 1 
January 2020, opponents have stated their intention to reverse many amalgamations if 
given the chance. This intention has been restated and been a topic of debate during the 
2021 September general election campaign. 
During the reform processes, studies have documented and analysed reform 
design (Nygård 2021), future reform processes (Fimreite and Flo 2018), first-hand 
experiences (Larsen 2016), historical and comparative perspectives (Klausen, Askim 
and Vabo 2016), to name a few. Studies on the long-term outcomes of the reforms 
should be expected in the future. Relatively few of these studies have, however, focused 
on the administrative sphere. In the international literature, studies of similar reforms 
that do take an administrative focus, tend to (1) take a macro-level perspective, and (2) 
focus on outcomes. Typical examples include studying changes in administrative 
expenses as a result of amalgamation (Roesel 2017) or effects of decentralisation on 
local governance capacities (Steiner, et al. 2018). In short, the rescaling literature, 
whether it is concerned with conceptual/theoretical development or empirical 
investigation, mostly focuses on causes and effects of rescaling, less so the processes by 
which the rescaling is achieved. 
Thus, my thesis adds and contributes to established literature by shedding light 
on the process of rescaling. I do so empirically through original survey and interview 
data collected after the LGR and RGR had been initiated but before all aspects of them 
were fully decided. This enables us to observe a unique ‘snapshot’ of administrative 
behaviour, because the collected data is ‘untainted’ by the regional administrators’ 
knowledge of the reforms’ outcomes. This is crucially important, because a 
consideration that those who study behaviour should keep in mind, is that behaviour 
towards a phenomenon cannot be entirely separated from the setting in which the 
individual operates. If a reform is set to change an administrative institution (for instance 
through territorial amalgamation or decentralisation), assessing the individual 
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administrator’s preferences during this process opens a ‘window of opportunity’ for the 
researcher. After implementation, the administrators’ preferences become more difficult 
to view as sufficiently independent from the decisions that were made by their political 
‘masters’. A concrete reason for this is that in the study of individual-level 
administrative behaviour, one must allow for motivations of a nature which could make 
the administrator less prone to criticise their administrative or political superiors’ 
decisions.10 If the outcome of some future reform is uncertain, we may more easily see 
the administrator’s behaviour as expressions of their own volitions. A very important 
characteristic of the empirical basis of the thesis is therefore its temporal dimension. 
Taken together therefore, the data’s temporal dimension, and the use of rescaling as an 
overarching framework from which we can understand administrative behaviour, places 




The thesis’ novel position can be further emphasised by its scope. Administrative 
preference research commonly measures elite administrators only. The rationale for this 
is understandable, as those in the upper echelons of the administrative agencies have 
more frequent contact with the political sphere (Bauer, Pitschel and Studinger 2010, 
Gains and John 2010, Studinger and Bauer 2012, Tatham and Bauer 2014a, 2014b, 
Tatham and Bauer 2015). Including all levels of the county governments’ 
administrations, from street-level to elite, broadens our insights. 
It should also be noted that in studies of Norwegian governance, the regional 
administrative level is a relatively neglected field of research. Further to this point, the 
Norwegian regional level comprises two different administrative bodies. The first, from 
which the survey data is drawn, is the institution underlying the directly elected regional 
bodies (the county government administrations). The second is the County Governor, 
an institution that represents the central government in every county and can be labelled 
regional state authority. They are a form of prefectoral institution, comparable (with 
 
10 A desire not to criticise decisions can for instance be explained by career ambitions (Downs 1967), 
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some variations in their specific mandates and competences) to the Swedish 
Landshövding, the Romanian Prefect, the French Préfet, or the Italian Prefetto. They 
are responsible for ensuring national policy is complied with and implemented at the 
local level, while also communicating local interests to the state. The county governor 
is appointed by the central government and is exclusively an administrative position, 
with no political/legislative authority (Flo 2021, Tanguy and Jean-Michel 2021).11 A 
more detailed description of this institution is provided in the thesis’ third paper. As the 
thesis includes data from both the county governments’ administrations and the County 
Governors, its scope extends to the entirety of the regional administrative sphere. 
 
 
1.2 Perspectives of administrative behaviour 
An individual’s behaviour is a function of values, attitudes, and preferences. But where 
and how are values, attitudes, and preferences generated? This is a vast question in the 
social sciences, encompassing many topics and disciplines (Banerjee 1995). In short, 
the answer depends on the discipline and on the researcher’s perspective. The choice of 
theoretical framework informs the data one gathers, and the interpretations and 
inferences drawn from them. Such frameworks, or perspectives, contain a set of 
assumptions regarding the population one studies. It influences explanatory variables of 
interest, and how said variables are operationalised (Alexander 1982). A complete 
overview of the various perspectives on administrators’ behaviour is too broad to be 
discussed at length here. I will instead briefly point to and comment on some recurring 
themes in public administration literature, before outlining my approach in this thesis. 
A ‘first order’ categorisation of behavioural perspectives may be labelled 
contextual, which holds that public administration itself varies across time and political 
regimes.12 Next, we may characterise perspectives, broadly speaking, as institutional on 
 
11 Non-capitalised version refers to the title of the individual office holder. They oversee the institution 
(and capitalised) County Governor. 
12 This represents too broad a discussion in this thesis. I rely on public administration (and its 
literature) as understood in western, liberal democratic systems. 
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the one hand, or individual on the other.13 The institutional vs. individual perspective is 
essentially a difference of the factors that are theorised to affect administrative 
behaviour. 
The institutional perspective holds that the administrative milieu can enable or 
constrain the individual administrator’s behaviour. For example, one may theorise a 
logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1996) which includes rule-based actions, 
control mechanisms, and individuals that fill their institutions with certain values, 
contributing to an office culture, which in turn affects the individuals’ behaviour.14 This 
represents a description of institutional factors as behavioural influencers that can be 
both formal or informal, such as hiring rules, professional norms, or socialisation and 
training within the administration (Olsen 1978, 74).15 
The individual perspective focuses on individual variation within administrative 
bodies, which may vary among several dimensions. Administrators’ behaviour may in 
this sense for instance be driven by self-interest (Downs 1967). Such self-interest may 
for instance be a function of the individual’s formal position within the organisation 
(“where you stand, depends on where you sit”) (Miles 1978). It may also take an 
informal form, such as anticipation of others’ reaction (Olsen 1978, 75). An 
administrative organisation may also be conceptualised as a social space consisting of 
cultural capital, and individuals will desire to position themselves advantageously 
within the hierarchy of that space (Bourdieu 1996). Other operationalisations into 
explanatory variables of the individual perspective include educational background 
(Yoo and Wright 1994),16 prior job experience (Egeberg and Stigen 2018), political 
 
13 These may be described as more overarching perspectives, and each contains multiple distinct sub-
categories of theoretical perspectives in the use of behavioural studies. 
14 Originally conceptualised as a behavioural theory of political institutions, it may also be utilised in 
the public administration sphere (Christensen and Lægreid 2017). 
15 Institutional perspectives have been used in studies of the LGR to frame analyses and analyse local 
amalgamation outcomes. Nygård (2021) demonstrates that reform design, and institutional 
organisation thereof, shape rules and consequently enabled and constrained involved actors, and 
intermunicipal negotiations. Bukve (2021) analyses negotiations between organisations at local, 
regional, and national levels, and finds that they shaped procedures and policy outcomes. 
 
16 Education may also be seen as more of an institutional factor, as it relates to socialisation. 
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attitudes (Stensöta 2012), psychological dispositions (F. Ritchie 2014), task preference 
(Gains and John 2010), and (desires for) job security (Studinger and Bauer 2012).17 
Institutional and individual perspectives need not be mutually exclusive as 
shapers of behaviour. Olsen (1978, 74) for instance, highlights how a mix of institutional 
and individual factors, understood as formal and informal, internal and external factors, 
shape administrative behaviour. Other mixed approaches include those informed by 
public/rational choice theories such as the budget maximising model (Niskanen 1971) 
or the bureau-shaping model (Dunleavy 1991) and point to the pursue of self- or bureau 
advancement within the government system. 
 
1.2.1 Perspectives and classification 
Studying behaviour towards a phenomenon and the inferences one draws from it, is not 
only dependent on one’s choice of perspective. It is also dependent on the classification 
of the phenomenon itself. The LGR and RGR are complex phenomena. As described in 
section 1.1, I view the LGR and RGR as instances of rescaling reforms. This definition 
opens the possibility to study administrative behaviour through the lens of the rescaling 
literature. As such, it enables us to theorise and measure administrators’ behaviour 
towards the LGR and RGR in a set theoretical framework in which not only the reforms, 
but also behaviour toward them can be understood. By translating the rescaling 
interpretations into attitudinal measurements, the administrators’ preferences and 
behaviour are studied largely from an individual-level perspective, but also contains 
elements of institutionalism. An in-depth definition of the rescaling phenomenon, the 
logics associated with its interpretations, and how they applied to the Norwegian case 




17 These studies have measured different phenomena and the individual-level factors have shown 
mixed results but have retained their theoretical (and sometimes empirical) prominence in 
administrative behavioural studies. The behaviour in question ranges from hypothetical governance 
preferences to specific case handling by individual administrators. 
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2. Rescaling: what, how, and why 
 
2.1 Definitions and types 
The study of public sector reforms encompasses a vast body of scholarly literature. It 
has both been moulded by and contributed to public sector developments over many 
decades, including new modes of governance and new paradigms of understanding how 
various public institutions operate and interact. 
A branch of this literature, formally conceptualised by Neil Brenner (1999) by 
bringing spatiality into state and political analysis, concerns itself with the scaling of 
governance. Governance scalability refers to the mobilisation of resources across 
organisations and levels to reap scale benefits from the provisions of particular solutions 
aimed to meet needs and demands (Ansell, Sørensen og Torfing 2020, 953). Rescaling, 
therefore, concerns the way in which scale effects are achieved by transforming the scale 
of a particular system. 
Brenner’s insights stemmed from observing challenges in the post-1970s years 
of urban industrial decline, welfare state retrenchment, European integration, and 
economic globalisation (Brenner 2004). To respond to these challenges, including more 
recent ones such as the 2008 financial crisis, states have turned to rescaling governance 
structures to increase, mobilise and promote economic developments and 
competitiveness from below (Brenner 2004, 2, Xu and Warner 2015, Bolgherini, Casula 
and Marotta 2018, 448). But rescaling as an idea can be traced further back. The thinking 
that there exists some optimal size and structure for a government unit is traceable to the 
end of the nineteenth century (Keating 2020, 5). In the Norwegian case, this debate can 
be traced even further to the formation of municipal governments in 1837 (Flo 2004). 
Brenner has argued that since its conceptualisation, the concept of rescaling has 
been stretched to a general descriptive category, an all-encompassing label for any 
sociospatial restructuring. He holds that rescaling “represents one among several key 
dimensions of contemporary state space, others being territorialization, place-making 
and networking/reticulation” (Brenner 2009, 131). It is, however, not the goal of this 
section to challenge the conceptualisation of rescaling itself. Rather, to place the LGR 
and RGR in a proper definitional framework within this literature, from which fruitful 
16 
 
investigations can be made. And so, it seems more fruitful to take a step up the ‘ladder 
of abstraction’ (Sartori 1970, 1040-1) and to define a concept at a sufficient level of 
resolution by suitably broadening its extension without over-weakening its intention. 
Indeed, such a definition can be found in related empirical literature. In investigating 
modes of intermunicipal cooperation as an alternative to amalgamation, Bolgherini, 
Casula and Marotta (2018) define rescaling as constituting a “reshuffling of scale in 
economic, social, and political systems”. Such reshuffling can take place both vertically 
and horizontally. In this sense, rescaling refers to the “migration of various systems to 
new levels above, below, and across the bounded state” (Keating 2020, 3). This allows 
us to categorise various forms of rescaling, and to place within those categories the LGR 
and RGR. In figure 1, I visualise a simplified conceptual taxonomy of rescaling and its 
sub-categories based on the utilised definition, and place the LGR and RGR within it. 
 





Rescaling a political system can take multiple forms. Within a political system, 
one may rescale competences and territories. My thesis is primarily concerned with 
these two forms, and I limit all further discussion of rescaling to these. Competence 
rescaling refers to the migration of administrative, fiscal, and/or political responsibilities 
to new scales. Territorial rescaling refers to altering the territorial architecture of or 
within a domestic polity, thereby altering the scale at which a jurisdictional unit, with 
all its responsibilities, operates. Beneath these two types of political system rescaling, 
we may add more categories still. 
Competence rescaling takes several forms, such as policy learning and adoption 
across states and governments (Cairney 2012, Keating and Cairney 2012). It can also 
involve imposing new tasks on one government level by another. This can take the form 
of decentralisation or centralisation (Xu and Warner 2015). It may also include 
privatisation of services (Samson 2008), the creation of new agencies for public service 
delivery through intermunicipal cooperation  (Bolgherini, Casula and Marotta 2018), or 
“statization” through the state creating or entering new fields of control (Li, Xu and Yeh 
2014). Competence rescaling, in other words, involves the relocation or allocation – 
horizontal or vertical – of tasks and responsibilities to new levels in a variety of ways, 
thereby changing the scale at which they operate. 
Among the various forms of competence rescaling, there has been observed a 
recurring trend of decentralization since the 1970s.18 Among democratic regimes, this 
has generally happened through increasing regional political, fiscal and administrative 
authority, with waves of regional empowerment taking place in the later decades of the 
1900s (Marks, Hooghe and Schakel 2008, Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010). A trend 
of decentralisation has also been found to be the case on a global level regarding fiscal 
policies (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 2009). Increased autonomy at the local level 
has also been observed taking place since the 1990s, though somewhat more modest 
(Ladner, Keuffer and Baldersheim 2016). 
 
18 There has also been a strong and recurring international trend of privatisation since the 1980s 
(Roland 2008). Given the theme of this thesis, however, I limit the discussion of competence 
rescaling to that which is ‘contained’ within the public sphere. 
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Hence, the overall picture of competence rescaling the last few decades is one of 
downwards dispersion of authority.19 
Turning to territorial rescaling, we can also describe several types. By far the 
most common is the restructuring of subnational territorial units within a domestic 
polity. Subnational units may amalgamate to form fewer, larger units. They may 
fragment into a larger number of smaller units. The geographical borders of 
neighbouring units may be altered, leading to no change in the total number of units. Or 
the number of subnational tiers may change by the abolishment of intermediate tiers or 
the introduction of new ones (Swianiewicz, Gendzwil and Zardi 2017). 
As with competence rescaling, territorial rescaling in Europe has also gone 
through several observable waves. The first, occurring in the 1960/70s, the second in 
the 1990s, and the third roughly from 2008 onwards. The most common form of such 
rescaling has been the amalgamation of local (and sometimes regional) units, 
particularly so in the first and third waves. In the 1990s, there was a notable trend in 
Eastern European countries of territorial fragmentation (P. Swianiewicz 2018, 
Swianiewicz, Gendzwil and Zardi 2017). Some rationales have been linked to these 
trends. Amalgamations in the 1970s is viewed as a “quest for modernisation, 
rationalisation and above all ‘economies of scale’”. The fragmentation of local units in 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s are viewed as a democratisation process to counteract 
centralisation policies during the Soviet era. Finally, the third (and current) wave from 
2008 onwards is seen as a response to the financial crisis, aimed at reducing public 
expenditures, improving service delivery, and rationalising decision-making processes 
(Swianiewicz, Gendzwil and Zardi 2017, 3;7-8).20 The theorised explanations for these 
territorial reform waves, are, like the explanations behind the competence reform waves, 




19 In Europe, authority has also dispersed upwards from the central to the EU level, which has 
partly been related to the downwards dispersion. It was this development, and the new modes of 
governance resulting from it, that in the early 1990s prompted Gary Marks to observe and conceptualise 
what is known as Multilevel Governance (Marks 1993). 




2.2 Why rescale? 
Two distinct ‘camps’ have emerged to offer explanations and interpretations both for 
why rescaling takes place, (or why it should take place), and what the effects of rescaling 
are (or what they should be). Commonly labelled rescaling logics, they are known as 
functionalism and community/identity (Keating 2020, 4). They each point and respond 
to different issues and questions regarding governance. One distinction between them is 
that while functionalism regards questions of policy, community/identity relates to 
questions of polity  (Hooghe and Marks 2016, 2). Both are, however, rooted in a deeper 
issue: determining the optimal architecture of government. And an important difference 
between them is how ‘optimal’ is understood. 
The functionalism and community/identity logics are employed in scholarly work 
as theoretical concepts or operationalised measurements. They can be contested at 
theoretical/conceptual levels (Keating 2020) or used as frameworks for generating, 
measuring, and analysing empirical observables (Tatham and Bauer 2021). Contained 
within the two logics are arguments that may mobilise rescaling preferences. These may 
be used by governments or other rescaling advocates to legitimise reform. Such 
arguments are for instance that decentralisation improves public service quality (Saito 
2008, Steiner, et al. 2018), that municipal amalgamation achieves economic benefits 
(Bjelland, et al. 2019), and that decentralisation and amalgamation can improve 
conditions for local democracy (Saito 2008, Swianiewicz, Gendzwil and Zardi 2017). It 
should be noted that these are here represented as normative positions of rescaling 
benefits. Empirical investigations into these theorised effects have shown mixed 
results.21 
As with rescaling outcomes, the question of rescaling causes is a two-faced one. 
As Keating (2020, 6) points out, there is a difference between causes and reasons. On 
the one hand, one may search for some causal mechanism to explain the phenomenon. 
On the other, one may ask what the given reasons to undertake rescaling are. My focus 
 
21 It is not directly relevant to scrutinise experiences of rescaling in this thesis. A more detailed 
discussion on outcomes of decentralisation and territorial consolidation is therefore omitted. For an 
extended discussion on these issues, see for instance Swianiewicz (2010), Houlberg (2010), Dhimitri 
(2018) and Tavares (2018). 
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in this thesis is firmly on the latter. Why are reforms like the LGR and RGR carried out? 
What do policymakers hope to gain? How can we understand their rationales? As such, 
the focus here is to discuss how rescaling is legitimised, from both a scholarly and a 
political standpoint, with the rescaling logics as an informative framework. 
 
2.2.1 The logic of functionalism 
If one asks what the optimal architecture of government is, the logic of functionalism 
will understand ‘optimal’ in an economic sense. The logic’s premise “is that the scale at 
which a public good is most efficiently provided depends on the costs and benefits of 
centralization for the public good in question” (Tatham, Hooghe og Marks 2021, 4). The 
functional interpretations of the causal mechanisms underlying rescaling reform, be they 
territorial, policy-related, administrative, or fiscal, or any combination of these, can in 
part be traced to public choice theories (Hooghe and Marks 2009) and literature bringing 
economic thinking into the public sector in the mid-20th century (Tiebout 1956, Oates 
1972). It addresses questions such as the proper jurisdictional size for (economically) 
optimal public service delivery, fiscal advantages of decentralisation and amalgamation, 
or efficiency of administrative procedures  (Dollery and Robotti 2008). As for the 
territorial aspect, the effect of jurisdictional size is also largely economically oriented 
(Swianiewicz, Gendzwil and Zardi 2017, 84-92, Tavares 2018, Dhimitri 2018). 
Oates’ Fiscal federalism (1972) may be seen in context of the emergence of the 
post-Keynesian era, during which changes to government thinking and modes of public 
administration led to the New Public Management paradigm of governance. This 
brought with it further focus on the notion of effectiveness in the public sector and fit 
the functionalist interpretation by arguing for rescaling to reap scale benefits from 
rescaling territories and competences. The theory of functional federalism holds that 
optimally sized jurisdictions can be achieved through the allocation of administrative 
functions, reducing service costs while maximising the benefits of heterogeneous needs 
and demands across the subnational level (Dollery and Robotti 2008, 11, Saito 2008). 
In addition to scale effects, the functional logic also argues for scope effects. This is 
built on the assumption that more public services can be delivered in larger government 
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units, thus allowing decentralisation to accompany amalgamation (Swianiewicz, 
Gendzwil and Zardi 2017, 20-1) 
Hence, optimal government architecture in a functional sense may for instance 
refer to public service quality, the efficiency by which they are provided, external 
service costs per capita, or net internal administrative costs. Typical examples of 
empirical literature within the functionalism logic is studying the effects municipal 
amalgamation has on administrative costs (Blesse and Thushvanthan 2016, Nakazawa 
2013, Reingewertz 2011, Roesel 2017) or public service quality (Allers and Geertsema 
2014) or how decentralisation affects public services (Saito 2008, Steiner, et al. 2018). 
And, perhaps boosted by the number of rescaling reforms undertaken in the last few 
decades, this is not a narrow research topic. Indeed, in 2018 alone, two systematic 
literature reviews on the relationship between municipal size and functional 
administrative effects were published (Dhimitri 2018, Tavares 2018). 
Arguments stemming from the logic of functionalism can be said to have reached 
their peak around the turn of the millennium. Economic globalisation increased its pace, 
New Public Management had been firmly established as the reigning paradigm of the 
public sector, and the new, post-Soviet world order was emerging. Nation-states, 
therefore, as Ohmae (1995) argued, would give way to (economically) functionally 
determined regional units which would constitute the building blocks of the international 
economy. Nation-states, as a consequence, would weaken their status as important 
drivers and participants in the world economy. Alensia and Spolaore (2003) further 
argued that nation-states exist because of the functional capacities under given 
conditions of trade (Keating 2020). 
The explanations for the rescaling trends in the 1960s/70s and from 2008 onwards 
have been argued to have taken place due to functional pressures and challenges that 
governments needed to meet. In the 1960/70s, this was due to new economic realities 
brought on by deindustrialisation in developed nations. The wave from 2008 has been 
due to strains resulting from the shockwave(s) of the financial crisis. These are 
explanations that can be said to lie in the functional camp and provide governments with 
reasons to undertake rescaling reforms. In the Norwegian case, rescaling– in particular 
municipal amalgamation – have historically mainly been legitimised through the logic 
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of functionalism (Baldersheim and Rose 2010). This was also the case with the LGR 
and RGR and is discussed in further detail in section 3.4. 
 
2.2.2 The logic of community/identity 
Where the logic of functionalism offers an economically based interpretation of 
rescaling, the community/identity logic is based on the demos. One may also begin here 
by asking what the optimal government structure is. But instead of functional and 
efficiency notions, the community/identity logic puts focus on the people inhabiting 
jurisdictions that operate at various scales. It “relies on the concept of ethnicity, 
nationality or national minority, seen as reified and unchanging entities seeking 
recognition and autonomy” (Keating 2020, 4). It is a logic that materialises from a who 
question: “who has the right to make collectively binding decisions for a particular 
group?” (Hooghe and Marks 2016, 1). The community/identity logic’s premise is that 
governance preferences are shaped by feelings of collective identities (Tatham, Hooghe 
og Marks 2021). 
The concepts the community/identity logic invokes is by no means novel. It 
relates to historical legacies brought on by long-established territories. In a more 
contemporary setting, one can argue that the issue and importance of community and 
identity has been reified and reemphasised in part due to European governance 
developments from the 1990s onwards, which has increased the authority of subnational 
levels, empowering particularly the regional level (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010). 
Historical/cultural legacies bound by territory, and the desires this creates for 
those who inhabit those territories to seek recognition and self-rule is exemplified for 
instance by autonomous communities in Spain, the German Länder, the devolved 
nations of the UK, or the counties and municipalities in Norway. Their institutional setup 
and levels of authority vary (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010), but a commonality 
between them regarding questions of governance is precisely the who question. Rather 
than functional thinking, it relates to a cultural homogeneity linked to territory (Alensia 
and Spolaore 2003), a feeling of ‘us’, and the desires it creates in defending these 
territories (Kymlicka 2007). Indeed, the explanation for Eastern European subnational 
territorial fragmentation in the 1990s can be seen as related to the issue of ethnic identity 
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groups within those countries (Kymlicka 2007, 185-6) seeking autonomy from centralist 
policies of the Soviet era. 
The want for communities to ‘defend their territories’ may, at a more specific 
level, have to do with questions of self-rule and (local) democracy; of feelings of a 
collective unity with the people in the same area; of attachment to one’s neighbourhood. 
Indeed, the focus on community and the who question has developed into a 
postfunctional theory for regional governance (Hooghe and Marks 2016), which holds 
that the logic of functionalism alone cannot explain governance scales, rescaling, or 
rescaling preferences. We must also account for the communities and identities present 
in various territorial scales. 
Economic and functionalist interpretations to rescaling issues have long tended 
to either downplay or outright ignore identity and community issues as important 
factors. While this might not be too surprising given historical and political contexts of 
the post-1945 era, as well as the years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the latter years 
of the twentieth century set the stage for the (re)emergence of community and 
territoriality of European policy and polity development. Marks (1993) observed that 
policymaking had spun away from the central level both upward to the EU and 
downward to regional and local bodies, giving rise to a new institutional setup, known 
as Multilevel Governance (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996). 
These developments led to the thinking that functional interpretations alone could 
not fully explain policy development and demands for involvement at subnational 
levels. The increasing importance of the regional level in the EU system prompted 
further investigation into issues of community, identity, and their effect on policy, 
politics, and polities. Empirical investigations into the explanatory strength on various 
governance issues, the identity/community logic vis-à-vis the functional logic shows 
that functionalist explanations are useful for explaining preferences and interpreting 
developments of the structure of government. But the community/identity logic has 
repeatedly shown itself as a strong predictor of preferences as well, particularly at 
subnational levels (Keating 2013, Tatham and Bauer 2021). Those who study the 




There is a potential conceptual challenge regarding the community/identity logic. 
Scholars often base and relate notions of identity to characteristics of minority cleavages 
such as ethnicity, language, or religion within the domestic polity. In this sense, identity 
is a directly observable product of history. Identity may not necessarily depend on such 
dynamics, however. Community and identity may arise from long established 
territorially based communities. These may create common feelings of belonging, which 
may materialise as feelings of attachment, produced and reproduced through discourses 
relating to the territories and communities in question (Terlouw 2016). They may as 
such also be considered socially constructed collective feelings of shared notions, 
histories, and practices, passed down and selectively remembered. Measuring ‘identity’ 
can therefore become difficult in a comparative perspective, because you may measure 
different notions in different places (Keating 2020). Exactly what characteristics are 
necessary for a territorially bound group to share for the collective provisions of public 
goods? Language? Religion? Living in spatial proximity (Tatham, Hooghe og Marks 
2021, 5)? 
Moreover, the definition of identity may even depend on one’s stance on 
territorial reform. In the Norwegian reform setting, opponents of municipal 
amalgamation have argued that identity is a product of history, and changes (especially 
if coerced) threaten desires for local self-rule. Proponents have argued that identities are 
fluid rather than fixed, and may change over time, in part due to new means of 
communication (Flo 2015b). 
Despite the contestation of the definition of identity, the community/identity 
logic may be operationalised and measured even if individuals within the same territory 
may give different answers when asked to define the origins of their identity. For 
instance, scholars have operationalised the community/identity logic by individual-level 
perceptions of the region as a (stateless) “nation”, the presence of a regionalist party, 
individual-level identification to the region, a regional language, or feelings of 
attachment (Studinger and Bauer 2012, 16, Tatham and Bauer 2014b, 246, 2021, 5). 
Seeing the community/identity logic manifested as individual-level territorial 
attachment and a desire to increase the autonomy of one’s “own” government level 
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makes possible to measure and observe such subnational phenomena even among 
relatively homogeneous populations within a polity, like Norway. 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to make a remark on the relationship between 
the logic of functionalism and the logic of community/identity. Though a jurisdictional 
design that reflects community may stand in tension to a design based on functional 
principles (Tatham, Hooghe og Marks 2021), the two logics are not necessarily 
dichotomously separated on a rational/non-rational dimension. The two logics as 
presented above may give the impression that while functionalism relates to rational 
thinking, community/identity represents ‘mere (irrational) feelings’. While the latter 
does invoke shared feelings among a community, pressures the community/identity 
logic give rise to are a manifestation of community-based interests.  Such interests may 
be entirely rational. A call for greater self-rule at the subnational level reflects a defence 
of one’s territory. This is important to acknowledge, because the two logics should be 
viewed as two distinct logics that relate to scale, and scale-based interest formulation, 
not as rational/irrational opposites. Once articulated as logics that mobilise and drive 
preferences for the architecture of government, and operationalised into explanatory 
variables, they need not be mutually exclusive. One’s attitudes towards the architecture 
of government may thus be predicted by both functional and community/identity type 
arguments. It should also not be the case that if both logics are able to predict certain 













































3. Rescaling Norway 
To underscore the relevance of the Norwegian case, this chapter is threefold. First, I 
frame Norway in an international context, describable as a typical yet distinct case to 
study rescaling reform. Next, I provide historical and political contexts of the LGR and 




3.1 The Case of Norway – typical but distinct 
Norway is a unitary system, in which the central level is the ultimate sovereign authority. 
Local governments become, in this sense, both units of self-government as well as 
agencies charged with implementing national policies, mixing local capacities and 
supervision from above (Sellers, Lindström and Bae 2020, 193;6) 
Norway’s subnational levels stand out in their capacities as public service 
providers. Indeed, among unitary (OECD) countries, Norway is behind only Denmark, 
Sweden, and Finland in terms of subnational expenditures as a share of GDP (≈17% as 
of 2016, with OECD average at 9.2% among unitary systems) (OECD 2018). The norm 
for a unitary system is to combine it with more centralised forms of governance. Though 
public services are mostly decided by the central government, they are implemented by 
local governments. Norway’s local level, therefore, “constitutes a major part of the 
public sector in terms of their task portfolio, the number of employees and in terms of 
financial resources” (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2014, 441). Norway is hence 
best described as a decentralised unitary system; a description shared with Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland, and Japan (and the UK after 1998) (Lijphart 2012, 178).  
The picture shifts somewhat when solely focusing on the regional level. The 
Regional Authority Index (RAI), conceptualised and operationalised by Hooghe, Marks 
and Schakel (2010), is a database covering 43 democracies / 45 countries from 1950 to 
2016 (Schakel, Danailova, et al. 2018, Schakel 2021). The index consists of two 
domains: self-rule and shared rule. The former concerns the level of authority a regional 
government exercises within its own territory. The latter concerns authority a regional 
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government co-exercises in the country as a whole (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010, 
13). Figure 2 compares Norwegian regional authority levels with a selection of 
developed democratic countries. Norwegian regional authority (thick black line) has 
been consistently lower compared to many other democracies since 1950. It is also lower 
than average levels of regional authority (thick black dotted line) in this period. 
 
Figure 2. RAI Scores Among Democratic Countries, 1950-2016 
 
 
The comparatively lower level of Norwegian regional authority is partly 
explained by a lack of any shared rule. The Norwegian form of decentralisation thus 
differs not only in its scope, but also form, of many other countries. As a unitary system, 
there is no regional “counter-authority” to the central level. Norway thus deviates from 
many of the countries in figure 2, for instance Spanish autonomous communities or 
German Länder, which enjoy greater levels of regional authority, in part due to their 
shared rule. 
In figure 3, shared rule scores have therefore been omitted to more directly 





Figure 3. RAI Self-rule scores among democratic countries, 1950-2016 
 
 
Again, however, Norwegian regions exercise less authority than many of their 
counterparts. But what is important to notice, is that the level of regional authority has 
increased over time. Crucially, this regional empowerment took place in the mid-70s 
and around the 2000s, which places it in a very typical position comparatively, as waves 
of regional empowerment took place across democratic regimes in precisely those 
periods (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010, 53). The increase in the 1970s is due to the 
introduction of a directly elected regional government (see section 3.3). In the early 
2000s, specialist health services and the county governments’ ownership and 
responsibility for hospitals were centralised. Though this could be seen as a downgrade 
of regional authority, it freed the county governments’ capability to distribute resources 
their own way (Flo 2015a, 306;366). Indeed, in this period, the counties also increased 
their borrowing autonomy to no longer require central authorisation.22Among the 
countries present in figures 2 and 3, therefore, Norway is placed in a very typical 
 
22 For a detailed summary of specific Norwegian regional empowerment between 1961 and 2010, see 
Norwegian Official Report (NOU) (2005:6, 6; 27-8), and Lyftingsmo and Hjortland (2009). 
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position regarding historical developments. Moreover, Norway is one of only a few 
countries where regional authority scores have never shrunk. In figure 4, the selection 
of countries is reduced to only include the other Nordic unitary decentralised unitary 
systems. 
 
Figure 4. RAI Scores Among Nordic Countries, 1950-2016 
 
 
Among the Nordic states, Norway (thick black line) is the only one in which 
regional empowerment correlates with wider international trends, and where regional 
authority has not decreased at any point in time. Denmark also increased regional self-
rule in the 1970s but reduced it with the structural reform of 2007, which among other 
things involved abolishing taxation rights of the regions (Vrangsbaek 2010, 27). 
Worthwhile to note is that Sweden’s drop in 1971 was due to a removal of regional 
shared rule. All countries’ RAI scores in figure 3 as of 2016 are solely self-rule 
(excepting Denmark, where 0.2 points of a total score of 7.3 is due to shared rule). 
Norwegian regional authority is as such both distinct, but also typical. Another 
key motivation for focusing on the regional level in the Norwegian reform processes is 
that the regional sector finds itself pressured from above and below. From above, the 
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two dominant right-wing parties, The Conservative Party (2013, 63, 2021, 64) and 
Progress Party (2013, 6, 2021, 8) want to abolish the county governments entirely and 
reallocate its competences to the municipalities and the state where appropriate. This 
position has been reaffirmed for the 2021-2025 parliamentary period. From below, 
municipalities are responsible for a greater extent of responsibilities and public services, 
particularly so in larger ones. This is also true for the County Governors, which have 
faced prospects of losing competences to the county governments and the 
municipalities. This setting, and the prospects of changes the LGR and RGR would bring 
(which was unknown at the time of the data collection) effectively means that the 
administrators faced potentially threatening changes to their own environments. This 
makes studying the Norwegian administrators important and interesting, as it invokes a 
question (that is contained in the overarching research question) of what sort of 
behaviour we can observe among administrators who are facing reforms that are 
potentially threatening to their jobs, institutions, positions, tasks, internal culture, and 
the physical location of their offices. 
The Norwegian case is interesting also due to the reforms’ design. Territorial and 
competence rescaling reforms are international phenomena but vary in their design. 
Policy may be imposed upon or taken from a government tier wholesale, or they may 
be more partially transferred through adoption, adaption and learning between 
governments (Keating and Cairney 2012). Territorial rescaling may be undertaken 
voluntarily by the local level itself. Alternatively, a central government may initiate and 
impose such processes upon the subnational level(s). Some degrees of mixed dynamics 
may also take place (P. Swianiewicz 2010). In the 2007 Danish structural reform for 
instance, municipalities amalgamated “voluntarily”, though backed up by threats of 
interventions, incentives, and with firm target demands by the central government 
(Vrangsbaek 2010, 38). In Switzerland, amalgamations are mainly voluntarily driven 
bottom-up, though has also seen some top-down coerced cases (Dafflon 2013). 
The Norwegian reforms, on the other hand, have mixed coerced and voluntary 
dynamics to such an extent that their processes have been described rather paradoxically 
as “centrally controlled autonomy” (Nygård 2021). This is due to the voluntary 
characteristics of local referenda and local amalgamation negotiations, which were 
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simultaneously supervised by the central government and ultimately decided by the 
national parliament. 
Another important characteristic of the reforms is their overarching goals. The 
Danish structural reform was undertaken to streamline tax systems, and to reallocate 
responsibilities for education, healthcare, transport, and culture (Vrangsbaek 2010, 27). 
In Greece, consolidation of local governments have long been seen as a tool to increase 
democratic legitimacy by hindering centralism (though is also accompanied by 
expectations of increasing public sector efficiency) (Hlepas 2010). In German Länder, 
municipal amalgamation has been seen as a response to functional criticisms against 
intermunicipal cooperation (Wollmann 2010). In Finland, local amalgamation efforts 
have mainly been about ensuring municipalities’ ability to handle the responsibilities 
required of them (Sandberg 2015). 
The Norwegian reforms, however, can be described as more ‘all-encompassing’. 
Both reforms contained both amalgamation and decentralisation elements. Both reforms 
sought to reap both functional scale and scope effects, legitimised by the need to update 
outdated local structures to reflect and respond to societal, economic, and demographic 
developments. Amalgamation was seen also as an opportunity to increase local 
democracy through decentralisation and reduced state micromanagement (Kaldager 
2015). Compared to rescaling reforms elsewhere, the LGR and RGR were undertaken 
with broader and ‘all-encompassing’ goals to improve the governance of the Norwegian 
local and regional levels. In other words, the LGR and RGR have targeted the 
subnational levels themselves, rather than any specific service or policy area, or any one 
particular governance value. 
Finally, a particular characteristic of Norway itself should be highlighted. 
Norway’s (political) history is strongly rooted in the local, and in the ideal of local self-
government (Gustafsson 1998, Sellers, Lindström and Bae 2020). Despite its unitary 
nature, Norway has a  strong periphery, and the centre-periphery cleavage stands as one 
of the most important and enduring cleavages in Norway’s political history 
(Baldersheim and Rose 2010, Østerud 2005). This cleavage is explained by many 
historical factors, such as a language movement relating to Norway’s union with 
Denmark and later Sweden, and that the Norwegian identity had to arise from the local 
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level because of it. Indeed, it is even claimed that in contemporary Norway, “the capital 
is perceived as the ‘least national’ place because it still reflects the influences of 
dominant foreign elites from the colonial and semicolonial past” (Østerud 2005, 707). 
The LGR and RGR were initiated, desired, and decided by the central government, often 
against local and regional preferences. The reforms therefore became direct 
manifestations of a tension between central authority and local autonomy, or the centre 
vs. the periphery. This is further discussed in the next section. 
 
 
3.2 The Norwegian Local Government – Roots and Developments 
The history of the Norwegian local government dates to 1837 with the introduction of 
the Alderman Act (Formannskapsloven), which applied to the local level the 
representative democratic principles of the national level. The act manifested existing 
historical and cultural roots and communities which had until then largely been based 
on church parishes (Sellers, Lindström and Bae 2020, 188). In this sense, the 
municipalities reflect centuries old communities, which still frames debates and reforms 
today. 
 
3.2.1 Early developments 
Prior to 1945, Norway’s municipalities underwent gradual changes, chiefly concerning 
their portfolio and status as a government tier. From 1837 and imposed by the central 
government, the municipalities gradually extended and expanded their fiscal and 
political portfolio (Sellers, Lindström and Bae 2020, 188). Alongside this development 
came a debate on the precise nature of the local-central relationship. The increasing 
importance of the local level resulted in discussions of peripheral autonomy and central 
authority – issues persisting to this day (Flo 2004, 39-42; 48-9). In Norway, the idea of 
local autonomy has strong positive connotations, which can largely be traced to this 
period. This is in part because the idea of "the Norwegian" had survived centuries of 
Danish (turned Swedish) rule, without a central government or culture-bearing elite of 
its own. Instead, “the Norwegian” had to base itself on identities found at the local level. 
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Local political units thus represented a continuity of communities dating back to the 13th 
century, even prior to the existence of a Norwegian state (Flo 2004, 43-8). 
In the decades following the end of the 1800s, the municipalities underwent some 
structural and institutional changes, and from 1945 onwards, they became a central 
provider of welfare services. Work on reforming the territorial structure of the 
municipalities also started in this period (Flo 2004, 233-4). 
In 1946, a commission was charged with considering the administrative division 
of the local level. It stated that municipalities should be capable of having “an 
autonomous life within the limits set by law”, and that local self-government presumed 
a certain economic capacity. Local units should retain self-government, while at the 
same time provide conditions for development, achieve economic stability, attain 
geographical tax equalisation, and develop a professional and efficient administrative 
apparatus (Baldersheim and Rose 2010, 81). This set the stage for a reform which 
reduced the number of municipalities from 744 in 1957 to 454 in 1967. 
In the following decades, further reforms were attempted, as different 
governments still regarded several municipalities as too small. In 1989, a new 
commission was appointed. The commission’s fundamental concern regarding the 
municipalities' was that their structure should reflect their capabilities to facilitate the 
realisation of national policies and goals. Submitting its report in 1992, a majority in the 
commission concluded that a reform was needed, driven by geographic functionality, 
municipal size, physical access, as well as special needs and adaptability (Baldersheim 
and Rose 2010, 82-3). A key recommendation was that all municipalities should have a 
minimum of 5000 residents. This was met with almost unanimous scepticism from 
municipalities with fewer than 5000 residents, peripheral municipalities, and those in 
proximity to larger municipalities. Larger, centrally located municipalities were more 
positive to the idea. 
Then the process took a somewhat unexpected turn. As a government white paper 
on municipal reform was submitted to parliamentary committee for consideration, a 
member of parliament proposed that as a principle, any municipal amalgamation should 
be based on the voluntary consent of the residents in the affected municipalities. The 
motion was passed, and a parliamentary majority thus opposed the government's 
35 
 
proposals of what would be coerced amalgamations, effectively making the principle of 
voluntarism official doctrine (Baldersheim and Rose 2010, 88).23 
In 2002, the Local Government Boundaries Act was enacted. It states that the 
national parliament has the final say on subnational structures. This did not overrule the 
principle of voluntarism, as it had not been codified formally into law. Consequently, a 
“political duality” concerning the authority to restructure subnational structures came 
into existence, in which principle and law ‘opposed’ each other (Klausen, Askim and 
Vabo 2016, 32). This tension between central authority and local autonomy created a 
setting of ambivalence for future reformers. Did the principle of voluntarism grant 
municipalities a veto against amalgamation, or did it merely give the freedom to 
organise local amalgamation processes their own way (Flo, 2017, p. 25)? This 
ambivalence had not been resolved by the time the LGR was initiated. 
While governments in the following years continued to attempt reform, strategies 
changed from direct central control to focusing on economic incentives and penalisation 
measures (Baldersheim and Rose 2010, 85-90). In the two decades following the 
principle of voluntarism was enacted in 1995, 14 municipalities amalgamated to seven 
new municipalities, leaving a total of 428 at the start of the LGR. Table 1 provides a 
historical overview of changes to the number of municipalities. 
Municipal structures and the question of amalgamations has almost been a 
political taboo subject since the mid-1990s. The Solberg government's initiative of the 
LGR created a debate which demonstrates the political volatility attached to asking what 
the appropriate municipal structure is. It also raises the question of central authorities’ 
limits in deciding public institutions’ organisational setup. Can the state force 
municipalities to ensure a local government structure sufficiently "robust" to execute the 
many responsibilities the required by them? The answer to this question varies from 





23 The proposal was made by a representative of the Centre Party, and was, amongst others, supported 




Table 1. Historical change in number of Norwegian municipalities 
Year No. of municipalities Change 
1838 392  
1930 747 +355 
1957 744 -3 
1967 454 -290 
1974 443 -11 
1978 454 +11 
1994 435 -19 
2014 428 -7 
2020 356 -72 
 
3.2.2 The Norwegian Local Government Reform (2014-2020) 
Upon taking office in 2013, the Solberg government signalled its intent to initiate a new 
national territorial reform. The minority government consisting of the Conservative and 
Progress parties had parliamentary support from the Liberal and Christian Democratic 
parties. These four parties had stated their intent to reform the public sector, including 
territorial units, in the 2013 election campaign. In the early stages after the election, they 
were supported by the Labour Party as well.24 All stated the necessity of amalgamating 
municipalities and expressed willingness to coerce amalgamations if necessary.25 
The platform for the Solberg government included a passage arguing for the 
initiation of a municipal reform. In it, they stressed the need to rescale both territories 
and competences based on functional arguments such as improving public services and 
administration. 
 
"The government will implement a local government reform (…) a more robust 
municipal structure will ensure more professional expertise in the individual 
municipalities. It will improve for example challenging child protection cases, 
resource demanding services and the leadership and development of care- and 
educational services (…) The government will undertake a review of county, County 
Governor, and central government competences with the goal of transferring more 
 
24 Labour's position changed in the middle of the parliamentary period, when at the party conference 
they decided that all amalgamations should be based on mutual agreement between the affected 
municipalities (Klausen, Askim and Vabo 2016, 43). Without Labour’s support, the government still 
had a parliamentary majority with one or both the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties in the 
2013-2017 period. In the 2017-2021 period, both parties’ support was needed. 
25 See manifestos of the Conservative Party (2013, 63) Progress Party (2013, 7), Liberal Party (2013, 
77), Christian Democratic Party (2013, 99), and Labour Party (2013, 66). 
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authority to more robust municipalities" (Political platform for a government 
consisting of the Conservative Party and the Progress Party 2013, 47).  
 
Members of parliament stated, however, that while decentralisation and territorial 
structures must be seen in conjunction, few could express precisely which tasks should 
indicate larger or smaller municipalities, and that this was a question of technicality, not 
principle (Klausen, Askim and Vabo 2016, 39). This reveals how especially the logic of 
functionalism motivated the desire for reform. 
The government appointed a commission to assess the structure of local 
governments and the transfer of responsibilities to them. The commission stated that 
significant societal and demographic changes had taken place since the 1960s, and that 
while the municipal structure had not been changed over the last 50 years, the 
municipalities’ portfolio had been significantly expanded, leading to an increase in the 
use of intermunicipal cooperation (Vabo, et al. 2014, 127). To meet the criteria they had 
outlined (Vabo, et al. 2014, 129), the commission recommended a minimum of 15.000 
– 20.000 inhabitants in each municipality. They also recommended that the 
administrative divisions be better structured to fit "functional development areas" – 
commuting, working, living, recreation (in short, an individual's daily life) – in a single 
jurisdictional unit so that inhabitants would spend more of their day-to-day lives in a 
single municipality, rather than operating across several. Moreover, central government 
should reduce micromanagement and develop arrangements for local political 
participation (Vabo, et al. 2014, 129-38). 
As part of the reform process, the Minister for Local Government and 
Modernisation instructed the County Governors to facilitate and review local processes. 
The county governors would then propose amalgamations to the central government. 
Table 2 describes the stages of the LGR, while figure 5 displays two maps. The left map 
displays amalgamation proposals the county governors made. On the right, the map 
displays amalgamations that were implemented by the parliament following the 






Table 2. Stages of the Norwegian Local Government Reform 





2014-2016 Local negotiation processes 
March 2015 Report to the parliament on new tasks to larger local 
governments 
September 2015 Local and regional elections 
December 2015 Public hearing on revised income system for local 
government sector 
February 2016 First deadline for local decisions 
June 2016 Extended/final deadline for local decisions 
September 2019 Local and regional elections; municipal councils to the new 
municipalities form 
Regional phase October 2016 County governors’ amalgamation proposals submitted to 
central government 
National phase April 2017 Proposal to the Parliament on new local government 
structure 
June 2017 Decision of the Parliament on new local government 
structure 
Implementation 1.1.2017/1.1.2018 First round of amalgamations 
1.1.2020 Second round of amalgamations 
Notes: Based on Swianiewicz, Gendzwill and Zardi's (2017, 35) description of the LGR process. 
 
Figure 5. Municipal amalgamation proposals (left) and implemented (right) 
 
Notes: Colours distinguish individual amalgamations, as several share immediate borders with other 
amalgamations. As such, they do not denote their nature as coerced or voluntary. Source: Edited 





Table 3. Municipal population statistics pre- and post-LGR 
Population size Municipal structure 2019 Municipal structure 2020 
 Population Share Population Share Change 
0 - 3000 271 271 5,1% 225 732 4,2% -0,9 
3000 - 5000 244 169 4,6% 185 486 3,5% -1,1 
5000 - 10 000 623 629 11,7% 481 163 9,0% -2,7 
10 000 - 20 000 768 749 14,4% 704 446 13,2% -1,2 
20 000 - 50 000 1 261 102 23,7% 1 265 232 23,7% 0 
50 000 and above 2 159 292 40,5% 2 466 152 46,3% +5,8 
Notes: Statistics from The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities annual report 
(2019, 30). 
 
The government did not officially express the number of municipalities they 
desired at the end of the reform26. It could nevertheless be reasonably claimed that the 
reform did not entirely meet the government’s desires. As table 3 shows, the share of 
municipalities with less than 20 000 inhabitants was reduced by roughly 5.8 percentage 
points. Opposition at the local level derailed many amalgamations. Some coerced 
amalgamations were enacted by the parliament, but further support for this dwindled, 
and after the Christian Democratic party withdrew their support for it, became 
unattainable in the following parliamentary period (2017-2021). Although the 
government was re-elected in 2017, the will to compel amalgamation was further 
reduced, leaving the 1995 principle of voluntarism the effective standard for future 
municipal restructuring (Fimreite and Flo 2018, 33). After the LGR’s implementation, 
there are few indications that coerced amalgamation, or any large-scale territorial 
reform, will take place for the foreseeable future. 
Regarding competence transfers to the local level, fewer tasks than initially 
proposed were decentralised. Table 4 provides an overview of competences proposed 
for decentralisation to local governments during the LGR. Among the notable of 
competences that were decentralised are the right for selected municipal representatives 
to marry couples, and the responsibility for public transport in some municipalities. 
Several proposals were withdrawn in the reform process. At the local level, many 
municipalities delayed their amalgamation decisions to observe decentralisation 
 
26 Some numbers were informally proposed, going as low as 77, but no number was officially declared 
as a goal for the reform (Iversen and Stensvaag 2017) 
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developments at the central level. As the list of potential competences gradually watered 
down, many municipal councils no longer saw the need to amalgamate, as they would 
not widen their managerial portfolio to such an extent that it, as they perceived, would 
necessitate larger local units. 
 
Table 4. Competences proposed for decentralisation to municipal governments 






Grants for housing establishment- and adaptation Implemented 
Dental services Proposed, retracted 
Child protection reform Proposed, retracted 
(trial) rural psychiatric centres Proposed, not 
implemented 
(trial) arranged work Proposed, not 
implemented 
Responsibility for financing patient transport Undergoing review 
Grants for business- and environmental measures in 












Grants for grazing area measures Proposed, not 
implemented 
Grants for world heritage sites and selected cultural 
landscapes in the agriculture sector 
Proposed, not 
implemented 
Some tasks in the law concerning Pollution Control  Proposed, not 
implemented 
Administration of game and inland fishing Proposed, not 
implemented 
Management of concessions of small hydropower 
plants. Separate proposal from the Ministry of Oil and 
Energy 
 
Management of protected areas Implemented 
Reduction of wind turbine power plants Implemented 
Regulation of snowmobile tracks Implemented 
Regulation of catskiing motoring Undergoing review 
Grants for volunteer centres Implemented 
Regulation of water scooters Undergoing review 
Naming- and address regulation Undergoing review 






Right for municipal representatives to marry couples Implemented 
Notary businesses Implemented 
Approval of swimming pools Proposed, not 
implemented 
Lost property Undergoing review 
Notes: List compiled from government’s overview of tasks subject to decentralisation during the 
2014-2020 period. Source: Norwegian Government Website containing press brief outlining 
tasks (2017). 
 
The Liberal and Christian Democratic parties have since 2013 been key actors 
for ensuring the LGR’s implementation. Although being pro-reform, they were less keen 
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on coercing amalgamations. As such, their support for coercion was not unconditional. 
A condition – perhaps the condition – for their support to coerce some amalgamations 
was the initiation of a simultaneous and similar reform of the regional level. This ‘trade’ 
became the effective foundation for the Regional Government Reform. 
 
 
3.3 The Norwegian Regional Level 
The Norwegian counties are, in a sense, both older and more modern than the 
municipalities. Though they are traceable in some form as far back as the Viking age, 
the (pre-RGR) county borders mainly date to the middle of the 17th century (Selstad 
2003). After institutionalising local government in 1837, the counties long served as a 
"joint" municipality, in which rural local governments elected representatives to discuss 
and deal with problems and politics of a regional nature. A central issue always lingered; 
what should the counties be and do? As with the municipalities, the counties could either 
be seen as autonomous units, or as ‘delivery systems’ for state policies (Flo 2004, 205). 
In the 1970s, several decades’ worth of ideas of the counties resulted in a reform 
summarised as “democracy, decentralisation and efficiency” (Selstad 2003, 61-3). The 
reform established a system of directly elected county representatives in parallel 
elections to the local elections. In 1975, the first direct elections to the regional level 
were held, the newly formed county governments received some taxation authority, and 
the county governments’ administrations were set up. The reform did not specify further 
tasks to the county governments, however. Despite involving significant institutional 
changes, the reform did not specify any further competences, and the county 
governments effectively continued as implementers of the state's regional policies 
(Selstad 2003, 64). 
With a newly established county government, the regional level consisted of two 
government authorities. The second being the County Governor, the state's 
representative in the counties. This led to a ‘tug of war’ between the two. The County 
Governor ‘triumphed’, and the county appeared more like a “special municipality” with 
just a few select tasks (Selstad 2003, 71, Flo 2004, 372). From the 1980s onwards, the 
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County Governor and the municipalities increasingly collaborated and increasingly, 
state and municipality “appeared almost as an alliance against county governments” 
(Selstad 2003, 73). 
From the 1990s, a complex mix of functions across the various levels of 
government had arisen. By the turn of the millennium, the county governments faced 
legitimacy challenges and a democratic deficiency, evidenced for instance by low voter 
turnout (Baldersheim 2000). Since the first county election in 1975, turnout has steadily 
declined from 70.3% to 60.5% in 2019 (Aardal 2019).  
In 1992, a public commission argued for larger and fewer counties, 
geographically structured to fit communication, commerce/industry and settlement 
areas (NOU 1992). In the following government white paper, the “need for larger units 
was strongly emphasized – to retain local democracy and self-rule. A rhetoric usually 
employed for small units was here used to argue for larger ones” (Selstad 2003, 77). 
 
3.3.1 The 2010 almost-reform 
After coming to power in 2005, the Labour-led (also known as the ‘red-green’) 
government announced its intention to reform the regional level with an intended 
implementation by 2010. The reform’s goals was to decentralise competences, and to 
amalgamate counties in order to achieve this on a large scale (Platform for government 
cooperation between the Labour Party, Socialist Left Party and Centre Party 2005). 
Though strikingly similar to the RGR, a significant difference was that a central 
condition for the reform was that amalgamation decisions were left to the counties 
themselves. A white paper (2007, 6; 85; 93) did state that should the government 
conclude that regional processes would not create a 'workable territorial structure', it 
could propose changes that deviated from counties’ preferences. However, with no 
counties desiring amalgamation, the government in the end did not use any coercion. 
Instead, some new tasks were transferred to the county governments. Lack of 
administrative and within-party agreement, as well as failed reform strategies have been 
claimed to explain why an intended large-scale territorial reform turned into a watered-




3.3.2 The Norwegian Regional Government Reform (2015-2020) 
After giving their support for coerced municipal amalgamations to the Solberg 
government, the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties desired a similar reform of 
the regional level. This was initiated by a parliamentary vote which first asserted the 
continuation of the regional government level, and then instructed the government to 
initiate a reform of it. 
The RGR process was run similar to that of the LGR. The Minister for Local 
Government and Modernisation had all county governments commence amalgamation 
negotiations with their neighbouring units to determine ‘viable matches’. Contrary to 
the LGR, the principle of voluntarism did not apply in the RGR. Instead, the new 
regional map would be decided exclusively by the central government, though with 
county governments expressing their preferences. 
At the end of the amalgamation negotiations, counties either expressed a desire 
to remain intact or to amalgamate with one or more neighbouring counties. The 
counties’ amalgamation preferences did not always overlap, and thus county preferences 















27 See government proposal on the new regional structure (Prop. 84 S (2016-2017) 2017) for each 





Alongside the amalgamation 
negotiations, the county governments 
also worked to determine their 
competence desires. This process 
took place in three main stages. 
First, the county governments 
decided and expressed their 
competence preferences to the central 
government. The competence 
preferences varied in both detail and 
scope. Some counties communicated 
only general policy areas, without 
specifying which responsibilities and 
tasks within those areas they would 
like. Others outlined specific tasks 
and responsibilities. 
The policy areas themselves also varied. All counties expressed preferences for 
greater responsibility of competences relating to climate and environment. Many also 
desired greater involvement in agriculture, roads/transport, and cultural grant 
management. Several desired greater authority over culture policy, and some wanted to 
re-regionalise ownership of hospitals and specialist health care services, which had been 
centralised in 2002. For a more detailed summary of the counties’ preferences, see 
Myksvoll (2018, 47-54). 
Next, a government-appointed expert committee assessed and proposed 
transferable tasks to the new regions, based on the planned regional structure, along with 
hearings from central government institutions and other involved actors.28 The 
 
28 Also known as the Hagen-committee. My main Ph.D. supervisor, prof. Anne Lise Fimreite, was a 
member of this committee. She was also my supervisor for my master thesis. Although she has 
contributed with in-depth knowledge concerning the RGR process, the information made available and 
her role as supervisor have not exceeded what would be considered academically ethical or appropriate 
in this work. 
Figure 6. County amalgamations in the RGR 
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committee’s mandate was to base their suggestions on the generalist principle, which 
states that every county government has the same responsibilities (this principle also 
applies to the local level). In February 2018, the committee published its list of 
suggestions (table 5), which were summarised in five general policy areas: 
 
Table 5. Competence transfers proposals by Hagen committee 
Policy area Responsibility 
 Management and ownership of at least 50% of Innovasjon Norge 
 Responsibility of ≈ half of industry/commerce-related research 
 Regional commerce program 
Commerce, Competence, Tasks and tools of the Rural Development Centre 
and Integration29 Responsibility of ≈ half of grants to Arktis 2030 
 Tasks and tools for career guidance 
 Increased financing for secondary and higher education 
 Parts of IMDI's tasks 
 Assets for institutions and arrangements of local or regional character 
 Responsibility for more cultural institutions 
 Responsibility for more museums 
Culture and Cultural Investment funds to musical, performing arts and museum institutions 
Heritage Protection Lottery revenue to cultural buildings and other cultural arrangements 
 Management of lottery revenue to libraries, archives, and museums 
 Most front-line cultural heritage task responsibility 
 Some environment tasks from County Governor 
Climate, Environment, Regional coordination in environmental law pursuance 
And Natural Resources Decision-making authority on water and wind power plant concessions 
 Public health efforts from County Governor, excluding supervision 
 Grants relating to local and regional public health promotion 
Health and living Pedagogical-psychological services, municipal guidance and support 
 Child protection institutions, foster homes and adoption 
 Family counselling 
 Internal and border-crossing railroad purchases 
Roads and Transportation Grants for expanded handicap transport 
 Management for grants to broadband development 
Source: Hagen-committee’s report outlining new regional competences (2018, 181-3). 
 
The committee’s proposals involved significant responsibilities, especially 
regarding cultural policies and commerce, education, and immigrant integration 
management. After reviewing the proposals, the central government decided which 
competences would be subject for decentralisation. Following parliamentary 
 
29 Integration in this context denotes efforts to integrate immigrants into Norwegian society. 
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proceedings, the government, with the Christian Democratic Party30, presented in 
September 2018 a final list of competences subject to regionalisation (table 6). 
The list of competences approved for regionalisation contained smaller, more 
specific tasks than the Hagen committee proposed. However, from a historical 
perspective, a significant regionalisation of competences took place, and regional 
authority in several policy areas was widened.  
A list of competences and policy areas subject for further review was also 
presented (table 7). These were not listed as definitive, and the government did not 
follow the committee’s proposals to abolish any state agencies. Indeed, in the months 
after the reform’s implementation, government ministers announced they would not 
transfer any authority to the regions regarding cultural institutions or child protection 



















30 Then the only among the four parliamentary/government coalition parties not in government after the Liberal 




Table 6. Final list of RGR competence transfers 
Policy area Competence 
Agriculture Grant management for assessment- and facilitation measures in agriculture 
 Management of grants for coastal forestry 
 Regional commerce program 
Commerce, 
Competence, 
Industrial garden program 
Incubator program 
Integration Some establishment grants for group 1 
 Corporate networks 
 Expanded responsibility for regional competence policies 
 Career guidance grants 
 Grants for internal company training 
 Plans to qualify immigrants to meet regional labour market needs 
 Expanded responsibility for strengthened basic training to youth 
 Grants for establishment training 
 Grants for mentor- and trainee arrangements 
 Grants for job chance B 
Environment Tasks relating to management of state-secured public ground areas 
 Tasks relating to archipelago services 
 Tasks within the cultural heritage area 
 
The Water-Energy Directorate shall consult counties in licensing procedures for 
building of water- and wind power plants 
Healthcare Grants for public health mastery and education 
 Grants for interdisciplinary efforts in the drug field 
 Funds for the program for public health work 
Northern 
Norway 
Grant management to Kven language and culture to Troms og Finnmark 
≈ Half of grants to Arctic 2030 that involves northern Norwegian actors  
 Clarified and strengthened involvement in planning of Arctic Council meetings 
 Establishment of a northern secretariat 
Regional Incorporation of regional development funds into revenue system 
planning Community development participation for larger state infrastructure projects 
Roads and 
transit 
County share of Sams Road Administration 
Responsibility for state-run fishing ports 
 Grants to fishing ports 
 Acquisition of domestic flights 
 Grants to non-state airports 
 Grants to extended handicap transport after it's financed as a national service 
 Grants for landslide prevention of county roads 
 Grants for walking and cycling paths along county and municipal roads 
 Extended coordination of public transit between counties and state  
 Cooperation between the counties and the Railway Directorate extends to: 
 • Route change processes 
 • Counties take responsibility for dialogue with municipalities 
 • Production of transport services 
 • Formation of demands for all or parts of the offered serviced 
 • Urban growth agreements 
 • Agreements for other parts of the counties 
 • Cooperation between bus- and train services 
 • Binding cooperation of route information 
Note: Sourced from the government and Christian Democratic Party conference (2018) announcing the 




Table 7. Tasks subject to further assessment for regionalisation 
Policy Area Task 
 Assess whether tourism initiatives should be transferred 
  
Counties' role in the competence reform will be clarified in the municipal 
proposition  
 Grants for educational associations will be studied, aiming to make transfer possible 
Commerce, 
If counties should be given a larger role in cooperating competence policy to 
contribute to lower unemployment should be investigated 
Competence, Combining labour market training with skills development is being studied 
Integration Minority counselling considered transferred 
 
Study of transferring resources for settlement in the regions and other integration 
policy 
 Assess whether further integration task strategies can be transferred 
Child 
protection 
If transferring child protection tasks to the counties will improve services will be 
assessed 
Culture 




Aim to transfer grants for broadband construction 
 
Table 8 summarises the various stages of the RGR, from its initiation to its 
implementation. 
 





June 2015 Parliament tells government to review county tasks parallel 
with municipal tasks 
July 2015 Minister for Local Government and Modernisation invites all 
county governments to participate in the reform process to 









September 2015 Local and regional elections 
April 2016 Nord-Trøndelag and Sør-Trøndelag decide to amalgamate 
April-June 2016 Government formally proposes the RGR; parliament supports 
establishing 10 new counties 
Autumn 2016-
Spring 2017 
Counties conclude processes of determining their 
amalgamation stance 
April-June 2017 Ministry for Local Government and Modernisation proposes 
new regional structure; expert committee appointed to assess 
competences transferable to the regional level, parliamentary 
decisions on county amalgamations 
January 2018 Nord-Trøndelag and Sør-Trøndelag amalgamate, forming 
Trøndelag 
February 2018 Hagen committee proposes competence transfers 
September 2019 Local and regional elections; county councils to the new 
county governments form 




3.3.3 A conclusion or a chapter? 
Since the RGR was initiated, its outcome has been uncertain in many ways. Both with 
respect to regional processes that have taken place since, as well as (lack of) continued 
national political support. In the autumn of 2018, the leader of the Christian Democratic 
Party stated his desire to form a new government coalition together with Labour and the 
Centre Party. The Centre Party’s leader stated that for such a coalition to take place, the 
regional reform would have to be reversed. The Christian Democratic leader failed to 
win his party’s support, and the party instead joined the Solberg government. Thought 
this ensured the continuation and eventual implementation of the reform (as expressly 
stated in the government’s new declaration (2019, 57)), it also demonstrated the shaky 
foundations upon which it has rested. 
The Centre Party, a continued opponent of the reform, has grown to historic levels 
in polls and elections during the reforms’ processes. It has repeatedly stated its 
commitment to reversing significant parts of the reform, especially the coerced 
amalgamations that formed the counties Viken, and Troms og Finnmark. This stance is 
also supported by many regional politicians. Indeed, in both Viken, and Troms og 
Finnmark, county councils formed after the 2019 local and regional elections express 
their intent to reverse the amalgamations, should a parliamentary majority support it 
after the 2021 general election (Brenna, et al. 2019, 4, Mo, et al. 2019, 3). 
Moreover, for the 2021-2025 parliamentary period, the Conservative (2021, 58) 
and Progress (2021, 7) parties have reiterated their stance that the county government 
level should be abolished. Hence, the jury is still out on the RGR’s legacy, and whether 
the debate on the counties’ role and place in the Norwegian government system will 
ever be settled. 
 
 
3.4 Understanding rescaling in the Norwegian setting 
As discussed in section 2.1, I view the LGR and RGR as two reforms composed of 
competence (decentralisation) and territorial (amalgamation) rescaling. In this section, 
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I discuss how we can understand the two reforms with the theoretical framework 
provided by the rescaling literature.  
Political, cultural, and historical contexts vary between countries, and provide 
different settings in which rescaling may take place. Indeed, as described in section 2.1, 
both competence and territorial rescaling may vary on multiple dimensions. Territorial 
rescaling may be of a voluntary nature, driven by local units without instruction from 
central government. It can also be a top-down process initiated and directed by central 
authorities. Rescaling reforms can be set within a specific time frame with target dates 
for implementation or be continually ongoing. The third wave of territorial rescaling has 
seen a mix of voluntary, coerced, bottom-up, top-down, time-set, and ongoing dynamics 
(Swianiewicz 2018). 
The LGR and RGR were set within a specific time frame, and contained both 
coercive and voluntary dynamics. Local referenda, though advisory, became de facto 
binding for many municipal councils, where most rejected amalgamation. The 1995 
principle of voluntarism meant the central government would not overrule local 
decisions in most cases, though it possessed the legal authority to do so. Forced 
amalgamation was more prevalent at the regional level and no county-wide referenda 
took place.31 After initiating the reforms, the central government instructed municipal 
and county governments to commence amalgamation negotiations with neighbouring 
units. The central government thus initiated, framed criteria, and decided the reforms, 
while local and regional units shaped them by communicating their amalgamation and 
competence preferences. 
The Conservative, Progress, Liberal, and Christian Democratic parties attained a 
parliamentary majority in the 2013-2017 and 2017-2021 periods.32 All parties’ 
manifestos called for municipal amalgamation and decentralisation measures. For the 
Liberal and Christian Democratic parties, this also included the regional level. This call 
 
31 A referendum was held in Finnmark after the parliament’s decision to amalgamate the county with 
Troms. This referendum was not part of the official process as determined by the central 
government. Instead, it materialised by popular demand, and was approved by Finnmark’s county 
council, which strongly opposed the amalgamation plans. 
32 Between 2013 and 2017, the government consisted of the Conservative and Progress parties. In 
2018, the coalition extended to include the Liberal Party. In 2019, the Christian Democratic Party 
entered the coalition. In 2020, the Progress Party left the government but continued to support it 
from the parliament. 
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was driven extensively and primarily by arguments related to the functional logic (see 
Conservative Party (2013, 63), Christian Democratic Party (2013, 99), Liberal Party 
(2013, 52;76-7), and Progress Party (2013, 6-7) manifestos). Some arguments have also 
related to notions underlying the community/identity logic, such as improving 
conditions for local democracy and increasing subnational levels of self-rule through 
reduction of central management and supervision. Mostly, the process of 
decentralisation was by the central government argued in terms of democracy and 
increasing local self-rule (see Norwegian government’s press release on the LGR’s 
initiation (2014)). However, as both the number of amalgamations and the number of 
tasks subject to decentralisation gradually watered down, a stronger emphasis on 
functional considerations remained. 
On balance, therefore, the desire to reform has been based on perceived 
functional pressures due to demographic changes from lower than desirable birth rates, 
and a domestic migration trend where younger generations moved away from rural and 
toward urban areas. Jurisdictional units no longer reflected residents’ professional and 
private activities, commuting patterns or recreational habits. This would in the longer 
term deprive peripheral municipalities of tax revenue, commerce, employment 
opportunities, etc., to the point where public service services would suffer. Rescaling 
local jurisdictions, they argued, would alleviate negative consequences of these trends. 
Municipal amalgamations would create “robust” units with larger economies and a 
professionalised administration equipped to deliver services more efficiently, with 
increased quality, and reduced bureaucracy through streamlining effects. Larger local 
units would also be able to increase their scope for handling services, enabling 
significant decentralisation. When the RGR was initiated, the same logic was applied to 
it, though also with some nuances of local democratic inefficiencies that decentralisation 
would improve. 
It is perhaps not too surprising that the functional logic was prevalent among the 
four parties making up the right-wing block of Norwegian politics. One can argue that 
the traditional political right-wing hold economic and public sector views which embody 
many of the arguments advocated by the logic of functionalism and the rationalisation 
of public authorities (Roberts 2011). However, it must also be noted that though parties 
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on the economic right have been shown to be more prone to decentralisation measures 
and increasing local autonomy (Karlsson 2015, Toubeau and Massetti 2013), earlier 
reforms (and reform attempts) in Norway have been undertaken by the social-
democratic Labour Party, which legitimised reform efforts through similar functional 
arguments (Baldersheim and Rose 2010). It is therefore not given that the arguments of 
functionalism pertain exclusively to right-wing parties or politics, at least in the 
Norwegian case. Instead, it may be that rescaling advocates turn to functionalism as a 
natural legitimising framework (which may in part be driven by actual functional 
pressures (Askim, Klausen, et al., What Causes Municipal Amalgamation Reform? 
Rational Explanations Meet Western European Experiences, 2004–13 2016)). 
By being legitimised through the arguments associated with it, the logic of 
functionalism thus became a ‘reform-creating logic’ from which the government framed 
and initiated the LGR, and later the RGR. 
The reforms were, however, not met with enthusiasm from below. In many 
places, local opposition hampered reform. Opponents of the reforms have primarily 
argued through the community/identity logic, in which local identities, self-rule, and 
democracy have been perceived as infringed and sacrificed by the central government’s 
quest for reaping functional effects.33 
Throughout this process, the central government faced local and regional 
resistance legitimised through the community/identity logic. Hence, while identity 
pressures can be used to explain rescaling and the territorial architecture of government 
(Hooghe and Marks 2016, Tatham, Hooghe og Marks 2021), they were here used to 
argue against reform. This ‘counter-effect’ based on identity issues is not entirely 
unexpected and is predicted in studies of regional authority. The identity logic can both 
spur and impede reform, depending on identity levels. This effect arises “because 
individuals prefer rulers who share their ethno-cultural norms”. Regional authority is 
thus strengthened where regional identity is strong. In countries where national identity 
 
33 Local opposition may also have stemmed from disagreements over specific amalgamation 
proposals. With 428 municipalities engaged in such processes, opposition reasons, like support, must 
be expected to vary. However, resistance towards reform was almost universally driven by a defence 
of local interests – and more often than not, particularly seen in public discourse, this defence 
materialised as arguments pertaining to local identity and attachment, and self-determination 
regarding territorial structures. 
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is strong and regional identity weak, one should find less regional authority (Marks, 
Hooghe and Schakel 2008, 175). In other words, the community/identity logic can both 
spur, but also impede reforms, as it did in Norway. 
Public discourse at all levels frequently expressed concern that the reforms were 
imposed from above rather than being locally anchored. The strongest opposition has 
come from Finnmark, which organised a county-wide referendum following the 
parliament’s decision to amalgamate the county with Troms. In it, 87% voted against 
the intended amalgamation (NTB 2018). The effects the community/identity logic thus 
























































4. Data and methods 
The thesis’ papers employ both quantitative and qualitative data and methods. The first 
two papers make use of an original statistical data set from a survey sent to regional 
administrators. The third paper analyses transcribed interview data with county 
governors, collected by the Ph.D.’s research project head, professor Yngve Flo. 
Although the data is described in each paper, pertaining to the specific research question 
and variables of interest, complying with word limitations in such papers invariably 
involves omitting some information. To address this, further details regarding the data 
gathering process and the data itself are presented here. 
 
 
4.1 A survey to regional bureaucrats 
The data set of regional bureaucrats’ attitudes toward the RGR was originally created as 
the empirical basis for my master thesis. The development of the survey began in August 
2017 and by late October, a completed survey had taken shape. It was based on 10 
primary sources for the variables, covering theories and empirical studies of rescaling 
(Myksvoll 2018, 30). I used the online survey tool SurveyXact to design the survey. The 
final version consisted of 41 factual and attitudinal questions, a mix of single and 
multiple-choice answers, and open-ended responses. 
 
4.1.1 Sampling 
The relatively small size of the Norwegian county governments makes it feasible to 
distribute the survey to the entire administrative population. The small size of the county 
government administrations, coupled with the fact that one cannot expect 100% 
response rates meant that a random sampling technique risked offsetting its 
methodological strengths (reducing bias and probability-based distribution of 
observables, for instance), and that some other form of sampling had to be undertaken. 
The survey recipients were selected based on the criteria of administrative 
employee in the county government’s central administration. With the administrations 
themselves acting as units, a clustered sampling took place, combined with a non-
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probability-based approach close to a purposive sampling technique (Etikan and Bala 
2017). The bureaucrats’ professional titles and email addresses were publicly available 
on the governments’ websites. Identifying, selecting, and registering individuals as 
recipients was thus relatively straight forward. The counties did (and do) not have a 
standardised organisation of their administrations, meaning there was some variation in 
the administrative departments and sectors from which the survey recipients were 
drawn. Despite this, a list was put together with as much overlap as possible, ensuring 
to the highest possible degree that respondents from each county would be drawn from 
similar departments. 
Some questions in the survey involved giving information of a personal nature 
(individual characteristics and political leaning). As such, permission from the 
Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD) and their Data Protection Services 
(Personvernombudet) was granted prior to distribution. This process also included 
contacting each county’s administrative head by both phone and email, informing them 
of the project. To increase participation rates, I also made a request that they would 
inform the employees of the coming survey. Most were positive, some required more 
information regarding data usage and anonymity. Though I do not know whether this 
approach did increase the participation rate, it is not unreasonable to assume it had some 
effect. 
One particular case in this process deserves mention, as it may have contributed 
to a lower rate of respondents. After having contacted and sent the information to the 
administrative head in Sør-Trøndelag county, a legal team assessed the proposed survey. 
They required more information and guarantees of data protection, beyond what had 
been assured by the NSD. Subsequently, further information regarding the authenticity 
and legality of the project was given through the head of the University of Bergen’s 
Department of Comparative Politics. This information was then also included to all who 
received the survey itself. All letters, and the form in which the project information was 





4.1.2 Testing the survey 
Following recommendations in survey-methodological literature, the survey was tested 
prior to distribution (Presser, et al. 2004). As the survey was designed for a very specific 
target population, the rationale was that, being ‘targets’ of the reform, the regional 
bureaucrats might have information, thoughts or preferences they considered relevant 
that was not covered in the survey’s first version. To address this, a team in the 
Hordaland County administration tested the survey, which yielded valuable insights and 
resulted in some revisions. 
 
4.1.3 Distribution and response 
The survey was distributed to 3628 administrators between 22nd and 25th November 
2017. This three-day interval took place as some of the administrative heads I had 
previously contacted desired an extra day or two to assess the project information and 
to inform their employees of the coming survey. Accompanying the link to the survey 
itself was additional information such as the purpose of the survey and the research 
project, estimated length (≈10 minutes), data treatment and that participation was 
voluntary. No incentives were provided to increase participation, but those who had not 
responded to the initial email received two reminders at two-week intervals. The data 
collection completed 16 January 2018. 
A total of 1301 bureaucrats fully completed the survey, giving a response rate of 
just under 36%. At the county level, response rates varied from 25% to 48%. Removing 
missing values when conducting analyses reduced the no. of observations somewhat but 
retained above 30% overall. Though a decent response rate, nonresponse was, as 
expected, a significant issue, as roughly two thirds did not participate. The reason for 
this varied from technical issues (survey script not functioning on the respondent’s web 
browser) to being away at the time of receiving the survey, or that the regional 
government websites were not up to date regarding their employee contact information.  
Though nonresponse bias is a nontrivial challenge for those conducting survey research 
(Blom, et al. 2017). Having tested the data for such bias after its collection, I have found 
no empirical evidence of significant differences between respondents and non-
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respondents that has led me to assume the data is unnaturally skewed (Myksvoll 2018, 
40). 
 
4.1.4 Construct validity 
Making sure the questions accurately measured the concepts intended is a fundamentally 
important aspect of any survey (Fowler Jr. 1995, Groves, et al. 2009, 50-1). 
Among the survey questions that are included as explanatory variable sin the 
thesis’ papers, two variables stand out as potentially causing issues of interpretive 
incongruence between researcher and respondents: 
 
To what degree are these factors important to you regarding the new county structure and governance 
system Norway receives through the regional reform? 
 
Streamlining / Reduce bureaucracy  Increased regional self-rule 
 Unimportant      Unimportant 
 Somewhat unimportant     Somewhat unimportant 
 Neutral      Neutral 
 Somewhat important     Somewhat important 
 Very important     Very important 
 Unsure      Unsure 
 
In short, the notions of bureaucracy and self-rule can have multiple meanings. 
Reducing bureaucracy can be taken to mean a reduction of administrative personnel, or 
a reduction of bureaucratic processes (red tape). Self-rule can mean the extent to which 
a government can exercise its authority independently, or the extent of its competences.  
Given the large number of individuals receiving the survey, it is not unreasonable 
to suspect a somewhat varied understanding among the respondents to these concepts. 
Such a varied understanding can be measured by the variables’ standard deviation. 
Neither displayed significantly higher standard deviation than other variables, or to such 
an extent that I have considered this to be an issue empirically. In other words, the 
understanding of these concepts among the respondents has appeared satisfyingly 





4.1.5 A point allocation method 
A core part of the survey was to measure the administrators’ preferences for the 
allocation of government competences across the national, regional, and local 
government levels. Sixteen policy areas were chosen, based on three primary sources: 
(1) the county government’s stated preferences to the central government, (2) existing 
research on regional politicians’ competence preferences (Lie 2006), and (3) 
international comparison by a paper draft (which has since been published, see Tatham 
& Bauer (2021)) (Myksvoll 2018). The original sixteen policies were reduced to nine in 
the thesis paper, as by that point the government had decided which competences to 
regionalise. The approach to measure the administrators’ preferences were designed as 
a 9-point allocation system, mimicking Tatham and Bauer’s (2021) design. 
 
You are now given 9 points to distribute between three administrative levels in Norway – local, regional, 
and national. The more points you give to a level, the more important it is to you that that policy area 
is located at that level. For example: Climate and environment: 7 to state, 2 to county, 0 to municipality. 
9 points are distributed in each case, meaning 9 for health, 9 for environment, etc. Be aware that the 
more points distributed to a level, the more this entails costs and financing, as well as rights and 
responsibilities to that level. If you are unsure, put 3 points in each level. 
 
Primary healthcare service Specialist healthcare service Climate and environment  
 National    National    National 
 Regional    Regional    Regional 
 Local   Local     Local 
 
Education – elementary Education – secondary Education - higher  
 National    National    National 
 Regional    Regional    Regional 
 Local    Local    Local 
 
Agriculture   Roads and transportation Cultural Institutions 
 National    National    National 
 Regional    Regional    Regional 
 Local    Local    Local 
 
Cultural arrangements and grant management  Sports                             
 National        National 
 Regional        Regional 
 Local        Local 
 
Labour market (incl. NAV)34 Immigrant Integration Regional planning              
 National    National    National 
 Regional    Regional    Regional 
 Local    Local    Local 
 






Community development Area planning 
 National    National 
 Regional    Regional                                    
 Local   Local                                           
 
The challenges to this part of the survey were more technical than conceptual. 
Limitations of the SurveyXact tool made it impossible to add an “unsure” option to each 
policy area. Moreover, the respondents could not skip past this section without 
allocating any points. This created a risk that respondents who were unsure of their point 
allocation would simply put 9 points in one level and 0 in the others, which, given a 
large enough number of unsure respondents, would significantly skew the data.  To 
address this, I included in the preceding text that they should try their best, but if they 
really were unsure, allocate three points to each level. 
Once the data was collected, a notable clustering around the 3-point range could 
be observed in many policy areas. It is difficult to ascertain whether this clustering was 
due to many respondents’ lack of opinion, or if it reflected their actual preferences. There 
were significant variations around the 3-point area despite this clustering, making 
probable both some uncertainty among the respondents, but also a genuine preference 
to place 3 points equally in several policy areas. The latter point is further strengthened 
when considering the types of policy areas in which this occurred. These were mostly 
policies where there indeed are several shared competences and responsibilities across 
the local, regional, and national levels. 
 
4.1.6 Analysing the data 
The survey data had gone through an extensive though mostly descriptive analysis in 
my master thesis prior to commencing the analyses in this thesis’ papers. Hence, we (co-
authors and I) knew some considerations had to be made of the data. The most 
significant of which was the possibility that the administrators’ preferences varied 
according not only to their individual characteristics, but also to higher-level variables. 
The administrators are, after all, clustered together in their respective counties. With the 
county governments’ preferences toward both amalgamation and competences varying, 
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there was a theoretical possibility that this variance would also be present among the 
administrations. 
Indeed, this was found to be the case in paper 1. Just under 10% of the 
administrators’ preferences toward coerced county amalgamation is explained by their 
county clustering. This induced us to conduct a multilevel regression. Additionally, as 
the outcome variable takes the form of an ordinal variable, a multilevel ordinal logistic 
regression was run, so that our findings display the administrators’ probability (in odds 
ratio terms) of supporting coerced amalgamation either increasing or reducing 
depending on the explanatory variable. 
The first step of analysis in the second paper was to assume such a clustering 
regarding the administrators’ competence preferences also. However, intraclass 
correlation tests revealed strikingly low levels of group variation. On average, regional 
clustering (again using county as the grouping variable) accounted for only 1.2% of the 
administrators’ preferences toward regionalisation of competences in the nine selected 
policy areas. Though a significant drop from the group variation on the amalgamation 
question, it was not too surprising after having observed an indication of this in my 
master thesis. I compared competence preferences among administrators’ preferences in 
each policy area and each county and found a strikingly high level of congruence among 
them (Myksvoll 2018, 53). Thus, with low levels of intraclass correlation and discrete 




4.2 Interviews of county governors 
The data utilised to study the county governors’ municipal amalgamation proposals 
consists of 17 in-depth interviews. The interviews were conducted by my co-supervisor, 
professor Yngve Flo in the spring of 2017, for the research project of which this thesis 
is also a part. The first interview took place 17th March, the last took place 2nd May. The 
interviews were semi-structured, with a total of 47 questions covering six broader topics: 
(1) interpretation of instructions, and reform conditions at the national level; (2) local 
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processes; (3) the governor’s role in the reform; (4) the proposals; (5) processes after 
proposals were submitted, and (6) status of the reform at the national level. 
In Buskerud, the interview included both the county governor as well as the 
process facilitator the governors appointed to support local processes. In Agder, the 
interview also included the assistant governor, as the County Governor institutions of 
Aust-Agder and Vest-Agder merged a year prior. The assistant governor was also 
included in Møre og Romsdal, though no institutional mergers took place there.35 
After conducting the interviews, a team of research assistants transcribed the data, 
leading to some variance in the way in which they were transcribed. Additionally, they 
were transcribed in both Bokmål and Nynorsk, the two Norwegian written languages. 
Together, these variations made earlier attempts of quantitative text analysis more 
challenging and was subsequently abandoned in favour of the comparative qualitative 
content analysis in the final paper version. A thematic categorisation (Kuckartz 2019) 
of the governors’ rescaling preferences is built from this analysis, based on the 
framework of the rescaling logics. The categorisation of the county governors was based 
on the degree to which the governors expressed preferences regarding municipal 
structures as reflecting the logic of functionalism or the logic of community/identity.  
 
4.2.2 Interpreting interview data 
The interviews were conducted after the governors had made their proposals to the 
government, but before the parliament had made its decisions. There is both a strength 
and a potential problem regarding this timing. A strength is that the governors lacked 
certain knowledge of the LGR’s outcome and thus could not refer to the parliament’s 
follow-up of the governors’ proposals.  A shortcoming, however, is that the governors 
could use local outcomes to legitimise their responses during the interview, rather than 
base their answers, such as interpretations of core elements of the reform (voluntarism, 
professionalism, instructions) on their own preferences and judgements. Because of this, 
there is, as is often the case with the interview method, an important consideration to 
 
35 At the beginning of the LGR, there were 18 County Governors. At the time of data collection, these 
were reduced to 17 by the Agder merger, a first step in merging the institutions to reflect the new 
regional map resulting from the RGR. In 2019, they were reduced to 10. 
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make regarding the researcher’s and interviewee’s roles. This has to do with one’s 
perspective on the interview, as described by Kvale (in Ritchie and Lewis (2003, 139)): 
that of the interviewer (and researchers) as a ‘miner’, or a ‘traveller’. 
The ‘miner’ perspective sees the interview as a method for uncovering knowledge 
that is already given, ripe for picking, “uncontaminated by the miner”. This view relates 
to a positivist notion (Ryen 2002, 35-7) in that the knowledge sought is objective and 
unchanged by the interviewer’s presence. In this sense, the county governors had 
underlying values and preferences regarding issues of functionalism and 
community/identity, such as pre-existing interpretations of the voluntarism principle, 
that would affect the type of municipal amalgamations they were willing to propose. 
When asked to reflect on these issues, the governors merely had to state their ‘timeless’ 
preferences and interpretations, independently of local outcomes. 
The ‘traveller’ perspective lies more in a constructionist or postmodern camp, in 
which “reality is constructed in the interview” (Ritchie and Lewis 2003, 140). In this 
sense, during the interview, the governors would “construct the reality” as they saw it, 
when other factors may have played into their decisions. An interview is, after all, a 
‘look back in time’, and the governors’ amalgamation proposals were made prior to the 
interviews. When faced with questions regarding those proposals, they then were able 
to construct a reality to legitimise their decisions. 
While these possible ways of interpreting the data could be discussed at greater 
length, I leave it here as theoretical considerations. When conducting data analyses, one 
must make choices. In this regard, I analysed the governors’ arguments closer to a 
positivist than constructionist understanding. But reflections of this data must still hold 
the door open to the possibility of a constructionist-type self-legitimising frame. My 
point is therefore to acknowledge alternative ways of understanding the governors’ 
recollections, and in so doing, demonstrate at a more general level the challenges 






4.3 Operationalising theories into measurements 
Chapters 2 and 3 described and discussed rescaling and rescaling logics as the thesis’ 
overarching theoretical framework, and the LGR and RGR processes. To understand the 
LGR and RGR processes, the logics of rescaling were translated into measurements as 
both attitudinal and factual data. Attitudinal measurements pertaining to the two logics 
of rescaling consisted most crucially of the three framing variables, which were 
presented in the survey as the following: 
 
To what degree are these factors important to you regarding the new county structure and governance 
system Norway receives through the regional reform? 
 
Increased regional self-rule36 Improved regional public services Reducing bureaucracy 
Very important   Very important    Very important 
Somewhat important  Somewhat important   Somewhat important 
Neutral    Neutral     Neutral 
Not very important  Not very important   Not very important 
Not at all important  Not at all important   Not at all important 
Unsure    Unsure     Unsure 
 
Additionally, the respondents were asked to consider their level of attachment to 
their respective counties on a 10-point scale: 
On a scale from 1 (no attachment) to 10 (very strong attachment), to what degree do you feel an 
attachment to the region you are employed in? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Unsure 
 
Thus, among the variables of main interests in papers 1 and 2, two variables 
consisted of measurements of the logic of functionalism (improved regional public 
services and reducing bureaucracy), and two variables consisted of measurements 
pertaining to the logic of community/identity (increased regional self-rule and 
attachment). 
Among control variables, several other measurements were also included. These 
were predominantly focused on scale effects at the regional level (county GDP, 
population, and unemployment level). But it also included one variable that could be 
 
36 The self-rule variable is in paper 1 titled autonomy. 
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considered a proxy of regional identities: the broader country region (east, south, west, 
middle, north). 
In paper 3, translating rescaling logics into observable instances of rescaling 
preferences was more challenging due to two factors. The first was the nature of the data 
as qualitative. The second was the fact that the county governors were not asked 
questions directly related to “logics of rescaling”. However, several of the questions 
posed allowed me to observe such preferences indirectly. Examples of these questions 
includes the description of the LGR itself. Many governors expressed a strong support 
for the reform according to functional necessities. Another question concerned the 
governors’ interpretation of the principle of voluntarism. The governors were almost 
split in half on whether this principle was positive or negative for municipal governance 
and central-local relations. The supplementary appendix of paper 3 includes all 
interview questions. Questions that contributed to this analysis are highlighted. An 
extensive review of the data was therefore seen as necessary but also sufficient to 


















































5. Synopsis of papers 
The thesis’ research agenda is to understand preferences and decision-making among 
regional administrators involved in two historic rescaling reforms. I have approached 
this through the theoretical framework of the rescaling literature, which interprets both 
why such reforms take place, but also the reforms’ effects. By using the rescaling 
literature as a theoretical framework, I extend the literature to the processes by which 
rescaling reforms are taken forward, and the ways administrative actors behave during 
such reforms. Each paper’s focus is distinct but related to the thesis’ overarching 
research agenda. In this chapter, the papers’ findings are discussed to contribute to the 
main research question. 
In paper 1, I discuss why functional explanations are suited (better than the 
community/identity logic) to explain support for coerced territorial amalgamation. 
In paper 2, I shed light on the way the community/identity logic (rather than the 
logic of functionalism) explains support for regionalisation of competences. I also 
discuss why some policy areas are more strongly predicted by the community/identity 
logic than others. 
In paper 3, I discuss the way we can understand the county governors’ roles and 
rationales for approaching their instructions to propose municipal amalgamations, 
emphasising why and how they approached them so differently. 
 
 
5.1 Understanding Bureaucratic Support for Coerced Institutional Change 
How can we understand regional administrative preferences toward coerced territorial 
reform? 
 
A wave of municipal amalgamation reforms has taken place in Europe since roughly 
2008 (Swianiewicz 2018). Governments have sought to improve the subnational public 
sector through amalgamations, to reap scale and scope effects. But changing the 
territorial architecture of government is fraught with potential pitfalls. Altering 
territorial borders is to upend established communities and identities tied to those 
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territories. If imposed from above, such reforms may also invoke questions related to 
challenges for (local) democracy and legitimacy of decision-making processes. 
Coercion from above also challenges notions of local self-rule and has been claimed to 
be at odds with individual rights, and human rights too (Erlingsson, Ödalen and 
Wångmar 2020). 
A recurring topic in political discourses regarding RGR has been the degree to 
which central authorities could and should overrule local amalgamation preferences. 
Earlier regional reform attempts did not overrule counties’ decisions (see section 3.2.1). 
In the RGR, central authorities were willing to compel amalgamations. The 1995 
principle of voluntarism did not apply to the county level. Consequently, as many 
counties were amalgamated against their stated preferences, meant that a significant part 
of the RGR involved coercion. This resulted in a highly contentious reform which has 
been contested on regional and national political levels by policymakers and citizens 
alike. Our (myself and cowriters Tatham and Fimreite) curiosity for this contentiousness 
was the motivator for the first paper. In short, we ask: what influences administrative 
preferences toward such a controversial process? And perhaps most interestingly, what 
increases support for it? By studying attitudes and preferences toward the perhaps single 
most controversial element of the LGR and RGR – the forced merger of counties – we 
shed light on the determinants for support towards a highly contested policy. 
The administrators are largely sceptical toward coerced county amalgamations. 
This is to be expected, given the nature of such a process, and the negative connotations 
it carries. Analysing various drivers for their preferences reveals that both functional 
and community logics matter, but in opposite directions. Functional arguments of 
reducing bureaucracy increase the regional bureaucrats’ support for forced mergers, 
while territorial attachment reduce it. It should also be noted that the substantive effect 
of the attachment is weaker than the functional, positive effects. Though higher 
attachment makes administrators more averse towards coerced amalgamation, the 
factors that make them less averse are much stronger. 
This reinforces the role of the two rescaling logics and the way they were 
mobilised as arguments for or against the reforms in the Norwegian setting. It is also 
interesting to note that ideological placement plays a role by observing that right-wing 
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bureaucrats are more positive to forced mergers. This is explained through a “logic of 
discipline” (Roberts 2011), which may relate itself more generally to governance and 
rescaling preferences along the traditional political left-right-axis. By far the strongest 
predictor for coerced amalgamation support comes from the question of voluntary 
amalgamations. Administrators who support the latter, are roughly twice as likely to 
support the former, even though the two variables’ distributions are almost mirror 
images (they are positive to voluntary and negative to forced amalgamations). This 
finding further indicates a picture that administrators, in supporting territorial rescaling, 
do so from a functionalistic position. If you support the one you are less averse to the 
other. It is then no longer about process, but about outcome; to merge or not to merge, 
that is instead the question. 
Taken together, the support for county mergers seems mostly functionally driven. 
Functional arguments for territorial rescaling often point to effects of such rescaling, a 
common measurement of which is increased administrative efficiency. Indeed, the 
“reducing bureaucracy” variable’s effect lends itself to support this. Descriptively, a 
majority of the administrators are in favour of the functionalistic framing arguments. 
Framing territorial rescaling as a functional endeavour, in other words, would mobilise 
regional administrators’ support. This is interesting when considering how functional 
arguments were mobilised to implement the two reforms. It indicates that administrators 
who perceive it important to alleviate functional pressures are more likely to support 
such measures it even if the means by which such measures are implemented is 
controversial. However, the administrators’ support is not totally unconditional. 
High levels of county attachment reduce support for coerced mergers. This is not 
surprising. The desire to increase regional autonomy – a second core argument in the 
community/identity logic – also shows a negative effect, but it is not significant. There 
is therefore something about the RGR process which is invoked by feelings of 
attachment but does not speak to the issue of regional autonomy as forcefully among the 
administrators. A plausible explanation is that while attachment derives from socially 
(and territorially) constructed shared notions, levels of a subnational unit’s autonomy is 
politically determined. And in a unitary system, it is determined by the central 
government. The lack of judicial protection from top-down institutional reform may thus 
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make the question of self-rule moot once a coerced process is already underway. 
Feelings of attachment, on the other hand, are less procedurally bound to such reforms. 
It is constructed and reinforced over time and represents, in the face of territorial 
alterations, a conservative stance against changes to a geographic unit one feels 
connected to. 
 
5.1.1 Voluntary mergers – the alternative process 
The chief focus of the paper was to determine the drivers of coerced merger preferences. 
But voluntary county mergers were also a part of the RGR. To reflect this, the survey 
contained questions on both forced and voluntary mergers, making it possible to study 
this process as well. The voluntary mergers were much less controversial. Though our 
curiosity mainly revolved around preferences regarding contentious processes, we 
included in the paper’s online supplementary appendix some analyses of the voluntary 
mergers. These were run through the same regression models as in the paper. 
In the case of forced mergers, the main sources of support have to do with 
bureaucracy reduction, support for voluntary mergers, right-wing ideology, and lack of 
attachment to one’s region. In the case of voluntary mergers, the main sources of support 
have to do with increasing regional autonomy, reducing bureaucracy, and support for 
forced mergers. 
Forced merger preferences are thus activated by more (and some different) 
cleavages among the regional administrators than voluntary mergers. Greater levels of 
attachment reduce their likelihood of supporting forced mergers, but it has no impact on 
voluntary mergers. Their ideological placement also does not affect voluntary merger 
preferences, which indicates that political cleavages do not matter where process is not 
contested. We can understand this to mean that political differences – and the logic of 
discipline that separate them – do not matter when the process of territorial rescaling is 
bottom-up. That support for increasing regional autonomy increases support for 
voluntary mergers (but not forced mergers) may be due to voluntary mergers being seen 
as a manifestation of self-determination on the counties’ part, whereas forced 




Territorial rescaling also takes several forms, depending on their design. One 
significant dimension is for territorial amalgamation to take a voluntary or coerced form. 
In this paper, I have shed light on the determinants for regional administrators’ support 
for the coerced amalgamation of counties. This was a hotly contested aspect of the RGR, 
and has been a continuing topic of political debate, including during the 2021 general 
election. But support from administrators, as direct stakeholders, may be gained through 
functional legitimisation of such contentious processes. 
 
 
5.2 Reserved but Principled – and Sometimes Functional: Explaining 
Decentralisation Preferences Among Regional Bureaucrats 
How can we understand regional administrative preferences toward competence 
decentralisation? 
 
The numerous (theorised) effects of territorial rescaling are perhaps best captured by the 
term scale effects. But accompanying effects of scale through amalgamation, one may 
also seek to reap scope effects. Creating larger territorial units allows for decentralisation 
to accompany amalgamation (Swianiewicz, Gendzwil and Zardi 2017). This means 
public services may be tailored more specifically to the needs and demands of citizens, 
which become more homogeneous at disaggregated levels, thus increasing their quality 
(Saito 2008). Pressures from below to rescale competences downwards can be explained 
by arguments pertaining to the community/identity logic (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 
2010, Hooghe and Marks 2016, Tatham and Bauer 2021, Askim, Klausen, et al. 2016), 
though can be argued for in more functional terms also (Oates 1972). The second paper 
in my thesis contributes with further investigations into drivers of decentralisation 
preferences. Specifically, it does so in a setting where regional demands for 
empowerment were close to non-existent. Rather, the desire to regionalise competences 
stemmed from the central level  Hence, the second paper contributes to established 
literature by introducing a setting where decentralisation is pressured from above; what 
then, are the preferences among those at the receiving end of this? 
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With the first paper exploring amalgamations, it was natural to include the 
regionalisation of competences as a subject of analysis. Though the final list of tasks 
and responsibilities that was decentralised was substantially reduced from earlier 
intentions and proposals (see section 3.2.2, table 6), a significant number of tasks were 
transferred to the county governments. The survey included a point allocation system in 
which the competence preferences among the administrators could be measured. The 
point allocation included the local, regional, and national levels. Having included all 
levels in my master thesis, and given the overarching theme and research question, I 
focused exclusively on the regional level in this paper. 
 
5.2.1 Analysing the data 
Nine out of an original sixteen policy areas in the survey (Myksvoll 2018, 27) were 
selected for analysis, based on the government’s decentralisation decision (see section 
3.3.2, table 6, and section 4.1.5). I ran all nine policies through the same regression 
models to compare how they are each activated by various preference drivers.37 
I decided to individually analyse the nine policy areas because the Norwegian 
regional governance system can be characterised as multipurpose. Norwegian regions 
have a set number of tasks and responsibilities that fall within specific policy areas. In 
this respect, the Norwegian multilevel system resembles that of type I in the multilevel 
governance literature (Hooghe and Marks 2003). Hence, it makes more sense to study 
the policies individually. This way, we can observe whether and how they are each 
activated by certain explanatories among the regional administrators. Are some policies 
seen as more fit for regionalisation than others? Do the administrators see certain 
policies fit for regionalisation due to certain explanations, while others are explained in 
some other way? 
A central finding in the paper is self-rule and attachment are the two most 
prevalent predictors for regionalisation support. Though the two variables measure 
 
37 In the paper’s supplementary appendix, I also included index and factor analyses. This was 
primarily due to feedback from reviewers, but I had also conducted such analyses prior to receiving 
the feedback. The index analysis did not produce any significant findings that could convey more 
information than the individual approach. The factor analysis returned unsatisfying and unreliable 
results. This is discussed at greater length in the paper’s appendix. 
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different concepts, they find a commonality which is effectively derived from the logic 
of community/identity. There is as such a potential relationship between the two 
variables. Subnational territorial attachments may motivate a desire for increased 
authority to that territory (as empirically demonstrated in this paper). But it may also 
lead to a desire for increased independence from higher authorities. The possibility of a 
moderating effect of attachment on self-rule was therefore tested through two-way 
interaction regressions. No change in the magnitude of the self-rule variable’s effect on 
any of the policy areas was observed, leaving the explanatory variables’ direct effects 
on the dependent variables as the main subject of analysis. 
 
5.2.2 Understanding the findings 
Regional administrators are largely moderate in their desires for increased 
responsibilities. Some factors increase their support for it, while very rarely reducing 
it.38 Though the focus is primarily on factors pertaining to the logics of rescaling, the 
administrators’ formal and informal positions within the administration also shows some 
degree of explanatory power.39 However, the strongest mobilisers of regionalisation 
support are found in the community/identity logic. In short, administrators who want 
more self-rule, also want more to rule over, not ‘just’ more independent exercise of 
authority. The desire to increase their portfolio of responsibilities is also often driven by 
their regional attachment. The higher the administrator’s attachment to their county, the 
more they want to empower the regional level. 
The support for competence rescaling is in other words driven by issues of 
community and identity more than functionality. Indeed, the functional frame of 
improving the quality of regional public services only affects support for increasing 
regionalisation of secondary education competences. This resonates with related 
literature in that policy preferences are shaped by collective identity and the want and 
 
38 A negative correlation is observed only between the administrators’ seniority and the immigrant 
integration policy area. 
39 The administrator’s rank and seniority became a factor of interest in early analyses. These variables 
did show some degree of explanatory power, but less so in terms of the number of policy areas 
affected compared to rescaling logics framework. I therefore leave the discussion of these variables 
to the paper itself, and instead focus on the logics of rescaling here. 
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ability for a territorial group to exercise authority within its own borders (Tatham, 
Hooghe og Marks 2021). The findings show that though they are quite reserved to begin 
with, the county governments’ managerial portfolio could – by the administrators’ 
assessment – be widened, and that this is reasoned mostly through the logic of 
community and identity. 
As with the first paper, noninfluential factors are also telling. The administrators’ 
preferences are not functionalistic in assessing the potential for widening their own 
managerial portfolio. Tasks and responsibilities at the regional level, in other words, are 
not viewed as dependent on functional necessities. Instead, locating more tasks to the 
regional level seems more associated with increasing the status of the county 
government (as well as a potential increase in status that would entail for some in the 
upper echelons of the administrations’ hierarchies, which can explain why the 
administrator’s rank sometimes also increase support for regionalisation). 
Analysing the policies individually and through the same regression models 
allows for valuable nuance. It allows us to observe how various explanatories affect 
support for regionalisation in some areas and not in others. So why are some policies 
affected, while others are not? Desires for increasing regional self-rule positively affects 
all policy areas. Higher levels of attachment, however, increase regional administrators’ 
support for regionalisation in secondary education, roads and transport, community 
development, climate and environment, and immigrant integration. It does not affect 
cultural institutions, cultural grants, agriculture, or regional planning. 
Though a factor analysis failed to produce any meaningful dimensionality 
between the policy areas, we may still attempt to classify the policies according to this 
effect divergence. I propose two. The first relates to the administrators’ perception of 
the policies as ‘visible’ responsibilities. The second has to do with their wider regional 
governance preferences, or a desire to retain competences they already possess. These 
need not be mutually exclusive. 
Firstly, a possible cleavage between the two groups of policies affected (and not) 
by attachment, is that those that are affected are policy areas which contain ‘visible’ 
responsibilities and services; in other words, there is a ‘direct’ line between the 
management of these policies, and the county’s citizens. Secondary education regards 
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pupils, their admittance to schools, and the availability and quality of education in the 
county. Roads and transport have to do with accessibility for car owners, commuters, 
users of public transportation, and the maintenance of road networks. In short, the ability 
for citizens to get to their destination efficiently. This can also be said to be the case 
with community development, climate and environment, and immigrant integration. In 
their respective ways, they all contain responsibilities and services that directly and 
visibly engage and involve segments of the population down to the individual level. 
Meanwhile, responsibility for cultural institutions and grant management, 
regional planning, and agriculture, involves more institutional and indirect, not-as-
visible services, for instance funding of cultural institutions, allotment of funds to 
cultural events, development plans in a specific region of the county, or agronomy 
funding and competences related to agricultural sectors. 
Secondly, the policies that are affected by the attachment variable include 
competences that make up a significant portion of the county governments’ 
responsibilities. Indeed, secondary education and roads and transport (as of 2018) make 
up roughly 80 percent of the county governments’ expenditures (Hagen, Knudsen, et al., 
Regionreformen - Desentralisering av oppgaver fra staten til fylkeskommunene 2018, 
23). In this sense, high levels of attachment also contribute to a desire to retain the most 
important competences the counties (and administrators) already possess. 
Contextualising this interpretation to the wider governance structure and reform setting, 
it could also be a manifestation of the county government’s placement as located in 
between the local and national levels, and thereby be an expression of confirming the 
importance of the regional level. This can further be emphasised in a historical context. 
The county governments have faced legitimacy challenges and the public has struggled 
to understand and know what the county government’s portfolio consists of (Selstad 
2003, 74). Indeed, the legitimacy of the county governments have been shown to be 
dependent on the services they offer (Baldersheim 2000). 
Though the decentralisation of competences to the regional level was watered 
down compared to earlier proposals (see section 3.3.2, tables 5 and 6), the prospects of 
extending the number of tasks located with the county governments formed an important 
aspect of the RGR. Taken together, papers 1 and 2 contribute to the overarching research 
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question by fully examining regional administrators’ preferences toward the rescaling 
contained in the RGR.  
 
 
5.3 Discretionary Manoeuvrability: The Logics Behind Administrative 
Shaping of Territorial Rescaling 
How can we understand administrative decision-making regarding territorial reform? 
 
What are preferences, if not the precursor to decision-making? And once given decision-
making capacities, what link do we see between preferences and decisions among 
administrators? The third paper analyses this link. It moves from the county 
governments’ administrations to the county governors, and their role in proposing 
municipal amalgamations in the LGR. Though they formally represent the state 
government, the existence of the County Governor is a manifestation of a representation 
of the local level’s interests. In this sense, the county governor is a state’s representative, 
but also a local watchdog (Flo 2014). When rescaling interests between the central and 
local levels ‘collide’, as they often did, the preferences the county governors had 
concerning municipal amalgamations became an important influencer of the future 
municipal structure. The length the county governors were willing to go in proposing 
amalgamation, in other words, would be a function of the preferences mobilised by the 
two rescaling logics. 
Figure 5 (section 3.2.2) displays the governors’ proposed municipal 
amalgamations next to the amalgamations that the national parliament decided to 
implement. Two distinct observations can be made from it. The first is that the 
amalgamations varied significantly in scope and form between the counties. Secondly, 
there is a large overlap between the two maps, demonstrating that the governors’ 
proposals were largely followed. This demonstrates that the governors were important 
contributors to the new municipal map. The variation in the governors’ proposals, in 
other words, became an opportunity for analysing not only administrative rescaling 
preferences, but also how such preferences affect decision-making. 
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The governors all claimed that due to functional pressures, territorial changes to 
the municipalities were necessary, or outright inevitable, either during the LGR, or at 
some point in the future. Seeing a necessity to reform local structures and receiving 
instructions to undertake a review and proposing role to precisely that end, one would 
perhaps suspect the governors to propose changing the municipal map more widely than 
they (overall) did. The fact that they did not reveals a heterogeneous approach to their 
instructions and that other factors played into their decisions. 
The central government’s desire to reform was chiefly motivated by functional 
effects. At the local level, questions self-rule, local democracy, cultures, identities, and 
attachment to existing structures arose, often resulting in decisions against 
amalgamation by local governments. In other words, whereas the logic of functionalism 
came to be a representation of the central government’s interests, the 
community/identity logic often expressed local interests. In effect, proposing an 
amalgamation, especially against local preferences, was to decide in favour of one logic 
or the other. 
The governors were given a mandate with a wide discretionary room. This 
allowed for diverging interpretations and proposals whilst still retaining loyalty to the 
central government. An important cleavage among the governors became to lean on the 
instructions as given by the central government (that is, the Ministry of Local 
Government and Modernisation), or the national parliament’s decision to base the LGR 
on the principle of voluntarism. Functional criteria assessed from above thus faced local 
self-determination. The degree to which the governors would propose amalgamations 
of a coerced nature thus correlated with the degree to which they leaned on arguments 
of functionalism. 
Relating the governors’ rationales concerning the amalgamation proposals they 
produced to the rescaling logics framework, a threefold distinction between them could 
be seen. This distinction was based on the extent to which the governors argued based 
on functional needs, or on adhering to local interests. It manifested by the governors’ 
willingness to utilise the discretionary room available to them, and to use that to propose 
coerced amalgamations. The willingness in question was whether they would propose 
new municipal structures that went against local interests. Most noted the necessity for 
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reform based on functional pressures, but not all followed this up with proposing 
amalgamations. Despite an admitted need to reform local structures, some governors 
held that top-down coercion would go against values of local self-rule and democracy, 
and risk overlooking local cultures, communities, identities, and feelings of attachment, 
making top-down coercion untenable. Amalgamations could in this way only be 
functional if they were also legitimate. This legitimacy, they argued, had to come from 
below. 
When a group of administrators receive instructions to carry out the same task 
and are given a wide mandate in which to do so, it should perhaps not surprise us that 
they will interpret those instructions in somewhat different ways. The source(s) of such 
different interpretations can be identified based on the researcher’s informative 
framework, of which a wide variety of theoretical factors exist (see section 1.2). It must 
be noted that reducing the governors’ decisions to rescaling logic preferences is to 
reduce complex human behaviour to a few variables. Among other things, it also omits 
more traditional explanatories of administrative behaviour (socialisation, career 
experience, etc.). Indeed, early analyses of the governors’ proposals tested such factors 
as possible influencers. Most notably their career background (political vs. 
administrative, and in the case of the former, government vs. opposition party 
affiliation). No correlations were ever observed. I therefore focused mainly on the logics 
of rescaling as a framework to understand their arguments and proposals. 
The final paper contributes to the overarching research question by analysing not 
only preferences, but also understanding those preferences with respect to the decisions 











6. Concluding reflections 
In this thesis, I have analysed administrative behaviour through the theoretical lens of 
the rescaling framework. I have done so with the Norwegian Local and Regional 
Government Reforms as typical, yet distinct cases. What, then, can the recent 
Norwegian reforms tell us of the wider rescaling phenomenon? The rescaling of 
territories and competences is an international phenomenon, occurring and recurring in 
waves across the developed world. The thesis’ findings thus have implications beyond 
the Norwegian, the Nordic, and even the European scene. Though rescaling reforms’ 
design can vary, such reforms are traditionally explained through two logics: 
functionalism and community/identity. I have analysed how those logics resonate within 
the administrative sphere, where such reforms are shaped, and from where their effects 
are intended to come. 
The Norwegian case is as such an opportunity to learn more about 
administrative behaviour. It is an opportunity to learn more about how rescaling 
reforms materialise, and how they may be designed. It is an opportunity to learn more 
about how we may interpret rescaling, and how the logics of rescaling can inform us of 
various aspects of administrative involvement in the reform process. Indeed, by 
focusing on the administrative sphere involved with and in these historic reforms, it is 
the opportunity to see and study the administrator as a target, a shaper, and an 
implementor. 
The rescaling of territories and competences involves significant changes to the 
institutional environment of the administrations in affected government units; 
administrators become targets of reform. Administrators serve important functions in 
the policy cycle, and can, through expertise and advice, or through decision-making 
capacities, contribute to influencing a policy’s outcome; administrators become shapers 
of reform. Territorial and/or competence rescaling is often undertaken with the aim of 
achieving scale and scope effects in the administrative sphere. The extent to which such 
effects materialise thus in part depends on the administrators’ support and willingness 
to accept the new institutions and making the new organisations work; administrators 




How can we understand behaviour towards territorial and competence rescaling among 
regional administrators involved in such reforms? 
 
This question has no one answer. Just as rescaling is a multifaceted concept, so 
are regional administrators’ behaviour toward them. In short, it depends on the type and 
form of the rescaling in question. 
Regional administrators’ support for territorial consolidation, when coerced from 
above, increases when put through arguments of functionalism (and likewise reduces 
when put through arguments of community and identity). Some interesting information 
to further this finding was uncovered in the third paper. When asked where local support 
for reform most often and most strongly materialised, the county governors almost 
unanimously pointed to administrative leadership in the municipalities, who expressed 
the same functional concerns as the county governors. The conditions for support for 
county amalgamations among the county government administrators suggest this can 
also be said of the regional level. Territorial rescaling, in other words, in the absence of 
preference divergence, is a highly functional matter for administrators. Territorial 
amalgamation reforms are commonly legitimised through the logic of functionalism. If 
functional arguments resonate among administrators targeted by such amalgamation, 
they will be less averse to undergo reform, even if it is coerced from above. 
Preferences for widening the regional level’s managerial portfolio, is instead best 
captured by the logic of community and identity. Regionalisation is a form of regional 
empowerment, and the increased importance of the regional level follows it. The desire 
to increase one’s ‘own’ government’s importance should not be unexpected from 
politicians – now, it has been observed among administrators as well, driven by matters 
of community and identity. 
Support for regional empowerment is, in other words, tied to their territorial 
attachment and the county government’s ability to exercise its authority independently, 
to retain the responsibilities they already have, and to ensure the services they deliver 
are visible to the citizens. This can relate to a notion of legitimacy and status of the 




The distinction between the logic of functionalism and community/identity has 
been described as a distinction between questions of policy preferences and questions 
of polity preferences, respectively (Hooghe and Marks 2016, 2, Tatham, Hooghe og 
Marks 2021). But for administrators to support rescaling reform, the question of territory 
(or polity) has here been observed to be a matter of functionalism. The question of 
decentralisation (or policy) is a matter of community/identity. 
All analyses in this thesis have been conducted with a primary eye on the 
conditions that increase administrators’ support for the LGR and RGR. Given the thesis’ 
findings, and the arguments for why it is important to understand preferences and 
behaviour among administrators, we may tweak the overall research question, and ask: 
If an institutional reform lacks support by the ‘inhabitants’ of that institution, to what 
degree can we expect the reform’s intended effects to materialise? What can we expect 
of the reforms’ legacies? 
To understand this, we have to understanding the administrators’ behaviour as 
contingent on the wider political and institutional environments. One obvious external 
factor is the 2021 September general election. During the two parliamentary periods 
2013-2017 and 2017-2021, the political opposition has stated its commitment to reverse 
any amalgamations that local or regional governments desire. But should the 2021 
election grant a parliamentary majority where parties taking this stance can form a 
government, how easy will that be? The LGR and RGR were fully implemented on 
January 1, 2020. The new territorial units’ organisations and institutions have since then 
had over a year and a half to ‘take roots’. Internal (read: administrative) adaptation to 
the new institutions, in other words, is an important factor to include, if we are to 
understand the ease with which one can return to a pre-reform institutional setup.  
Government is a complex machinery. Territorial fragmentation, like 
amalgamation, involves much organisational and institutional restructuring. An 
expectation can therefore be made that if administrative resistance originally made 
amalgamation, implementation, and adaptation difficult, fragmentation will be more 
easily achievable. If, on the other hand, the administrations acknowledged functional 
needs to reform, and intended scale and scope effects are reached, it can make a ‘break-
up’ process more difficult. If scale and/or scope effects did not materialise or has become 
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perceived as functionally untenable by not only politicians, but also administrators, it 
may make fragmentation easier. 
The reforms’ legacies, in other words, are affected by the rescaling logics’ 
resonance within the institutions undergoing such restructuring and demonstrates why 
an administration’s support is an important element for successful institutional reform. 
Whether functional effects will be reaped from the LGR and RGR is, however, yet to be 
seen. Such effects may take years to become observable and measurable. All the pro-
reform actors can do in the meantime is hope no one will reverse the new structures 
before such effects (may) materialise. 
The LGR and RGR materialised from functional thinking at the central level. The 
logic of community and identity diluted and impeded intended outcomes at the local and 
regional levels. Should a policy of fragmentation succeed the policy of amalgamation, 
it will stand as a testament to the strength and importance of the arguments pertaining 
to the community/identity logic where matters of rescaling are concerned. It will also 
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Reserved but Principled – and Sometimes 
Functional: Explaining Decentralisation Preferences 
Among Regional Bureaucrats 




In recent decades, decentralisation measures have been implemented in most advanced 
democracies. While such reforms may be driven by subnational pressures and demands 
for empowerment, the central government usually has the deciding power to decentralise. 
Literature on regional preference has proliferated since the 1990s, though we know little 
of regional administrative preferences in relation to this process. As policy formulators 
and implementers, they are directly affected by dispersion of authority downwards, as it 
directly affects their organisational structures and portfolio of responsibilities. This article 
analyses decentralisation preferences among regional bureaucrats in Norway in the 
context of the 2015-2020 Regional Government Reform. Utilising an original survey and 
testing five explanations, the bureaucrats are generally reserved about taking on 
additional functions, with support for increasing their portfolio primarily explained by a 
principled motivation to increase regional autonomy, followed by feelings of regional 
attachment. Functional arguments also matter, though to a lesser extent. The bureaucrats’ 
principled, rather than functional, attitude towards regionalisation deviates from 
theoretical premises of decentralisation literature, while also challenging more underlying 
notions of bureaucratic thinking, inviting further research into how these dynamics 
manifest themselves among members of the civil service. 
 
Introduction 
In most states today, competences – for instances a specific welfare service – are 
located at the government level where they are deemed best suited and most 
effective when provided to the citizens. A trend of regionalisation has been 
documented among most advanced democracies in the decades since 1950, with 
particular waves of reform in the 1970s and 1990s (Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 
2010). Further regional empowerment has continued since then, accompanied by 
increased scholarly attention to the regional level. A common feature of this 
process has been the dispersion of competences downwards from the national 
level (and in some cases upwards from the local level). Such a reallocation of 
competences affects the administrative capacities of the government levels 
affected, through for instance, the reorganisation of budgetary and human 
resources. As their jobs consist of implementing and administrating policies, 
political decisions and various forms of services, reforming their managerial 
portfolio makes regional administrations direct stakeholders in regionalisation 
reforms.  
Upwards communication in the administrative chain of command, and the 
administrative- political contact at the upper echelons of a bureaucracy, is a 
(though not the only one) source of influence for policy formulation. In this 
regard, bureaucrats play important roles regarding not only policy     
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implementation, but also its design, making it relevant and important to 
understand their reform motivations and preferences (Egeberg & Stigen, 2018). 
Bureaucrats’ preference for certain kinds of tasks may have implications for how 
they respond to institutional reform. This is especially so when the design of the 
bureaucracy is altered, providing opportunities to shape their working 
environments (Gains & John, 2010, p. 456). Moreover, administrative resistance 
against structural reform can make implementation more difficult, and their post-
reform working environments more uncertain (and vice versa). With reforms set 
to take place, do bureaucrats actually desire a broader portfolio of 
responsibilities, or do they prefer to preserve the status quo? And what factors 
explain such preferences?  
With a documented trend of regional empowerment, particularly relating to 
institutional developments in the EU since the 1990s (Marks, 1993), scholars 
have sought to explain preferences of regional actors for a range of topics, and 
also developed models to explain these preferences. This literature has usually 
addressed topics related either to externalities, for instance regional preferences 
regarding the institutional arrangement of the supranational level (Tatham & 
Bauer, 2014b) or identifying drivers of preferences regarding norms of 
governance, such as what ought to be the government’s role in the economy 
(Tatham & Bauer, 2015). It has to a lesser extent addressed preferences 
regarding regional institutions themselves, such as the role and scope of regional 
government, or attitudes towards regional institutional change.  
This article seeks to address that. Utilising decentralisation theory and public 
administration literature, it explores Norwegian regional bureaucrats’ 
preferences for the regionalisation of competences, plugging both a substantive 
and geographical gap by adding a Nordic setting to the literature, which thus far 
has been largely neglected.  
In 2020, the Norwegian Regional Government Reform amalgamated 15 of 
19 counties, forming 11 new regions, as well as transferring some new 
competences and administrative functions to the regional level. Initiated and 
implemented by the central government, and not explicitly driven by regional 
demands, this reform provides an opportunity to study decentralisation 
preferences among regional administrators outside an otherwise common setting 
in which such reforms are desired or demanded at the subnational level. While 
the attitudes of citizens and politicians towards the reform have been 
documented in both academic and non-academic literature, less is known about 
the regional bureaucrats, whose jobs, tasks, and positions were directly affected 
by the reform’s outcome.1  
Utilising original survey data collected from Norwegian regional bureaucrats 
during the reform process, this article explores factors that affect their desire to 
increase the regional portfolio of responsibilities and competences in nine policy 
areas.  
Overall, the regional bureaucrats do not display a great desire for large-scale 
regionalisation of competences, indicating instead a preference for (pre-reform) 
status-quo arrangements. Where a desire for regionalisation is observed, it is 
primarily driven by a principled rather than functional dynamics. Bureaucrats 




desiring increased levels of autonomy, and those highly attached to their 
counties are largely positive towards widening the regional portfolio. This is also 
true, though to a lesser extent, for administrative elites. The bureaucrats’ 
seniority does not matter much, and when it does, its effect is more ambivalent, 
representing the only case where they want fewer functions located at the 
regional level. While improving regional public service quality is considered 
highly desirable, it does not affect their regionalisation preferences. It is also 
unaffected by their attitudes towards increased regional autonomy, indicating an 
overall picture of bureaucrats driven more by principles of governance and 
logics of identity rather than arguments pertaining to functional effects. The 
relative importance of these two dynamics is somewhat surprising, challenging 
theoretical arguments for decentralisation as well as general notions of 
bureaucratic thinking.  
The article is structured as follows: The next section briefly summarises the 
2015-2020 Norwegian Regional Government Reform. Following this, the third 
section outlines theoretical expectations and hypotheses, before defining data 
collection and research designs in the fourth section. Results are then presented, 
followed by discussions of central findings, with concluding remarks. The article 
thus contributes to our empirical knowledge of administrative preferences, 
shedding light on the determinants of support towards downwards dispersion of 
competences.  
 
The Norwegian Regional Reform  
Since the mid-20th century, the territorial structure and competence portfolio of 
the Norwegian counties have been subject to debate, reforms and attempts at 
reforms. Although periodically, various central government-appointed 
commissions have stressed a need to reform, the outcome has usually been minor 
administrative responsibility transfers to or from the regional level.2 
In 2013, the newly elected minority coalition government consisting of the 
Conservative and Progress parties initiated a municipal amalgamation reform, 
relying on the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties to secure a parliamentary 
majority. By creating larger municipal units, the government parties claimed the 
regional tier to be superfluous, preferring to abolish the county governments and 
transfer their functions to the local level. A parliamentary majority for the 
abolition of the regional level has historically been non-existent, however. 
Moreover, wanting to decentralise functions from the central level to the 
counties, the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties desired a similar reform 
of the regional level in exchange for backing the government's municipal reform.  
The government agreed, and in 2015, the Minister of Local Government and 
Modernisation engaged the counties' elected officials to commence processes to 
determine their decentralisation and amalgamation preferences. Many counties 
held the former as conditional for accepting the latter. The counties' competence 
preferences ranged from broad and general policy areas to individual and 
specific administrative tasks and responsibilities, while also stressing the 







Since the 1970s, administrative reforms have reallocated competences both 
to and from the regional level – the most significant of which was the 
centralisation of hospital ownership and specialist healthcare services in 2002, 
which had until then grown to become the largest area of responsibility for the 
counties.3 Prior to the regional reform, the Norwegian counties' competences 
consisted of:  
 
1. Secondary schools, including adult training and vocational education. 
This being the most significant policy area, amounting to roughly 47% 
of the county's expenses,  
2. Public transport systems and county roads; following secondary 
education in significance, amounting to roughly 21% and 12% of the 
county's expenses, respectively,  
3. Dental services,  
4. Culture, including the management of lottery funds for sports facilities 
and cultural buildings as well as cultural heritage protection,  
5. Environmental and water management authority, including allocation of 
fish farming licenses,  
6. Regional research funds and innovation, and (7) Business and 
commerce related activities.  
 
In addition to these, cross-sector and cross-level cooperation regarding the 
overall development and planning of the regional level also takes place.4  
After the counties had expressed their decentralisation preferences, a 
government-appointed committee proposed a range of tasks to be transferred, 
which was summarised into five broad areas:  
 
1. Commerce, Competence and Integration, 
2. Culture and Cultural Heritage Protection 
3. Climate, Environment and Natural Resources,  
4. Health and Living, and 
5. Roads and Transport.  
 
After concluding hearings on the committee's report, the government issued 
a white paper laying out a list of functions they would transfer, which partly 
reflected those suggested by the committee. It also stipulated that further 
competences would be subject to review for decentralisation in the future. The 
government transferred functions within: 
  
1. Business and Business-oriented Research,  
2. Agriculture,  
3. Roads, Transport and Related Infrastructure,  
4. Competence and Integration,  
5. Public Health,  
6. Northern Norway (involving matters relating to the arctic area, and as 
such only applicable to the northern counties), and  
7. Climate and Environment.  




Competences subject to consideration in the future included: 
1. Business and Business-oriented Research,  
2. Competence and Integration, 
3. Child Protective Services and  
4. Culture 
 
On 1 January 2020, the reform was implemented, amalgamating counties as 
well as transferring the competences. It is interesting to note that the reform was 
largely desired, initiated, designed, and implemented at the central level, without 
being grounded in regional desires. In fact, it was widely resisted at the regional 
level, largely due to the amalgamations, several of which happened against the 
counties’ will. This created a context in which we may examine preferences 
towards regionalisation processes when they are not the result of subnational 
pressures, which has often been an important motivator and cause for regional 
reform elsewhere.  
 
Theoretical Framework  
Since the 1990s, theoretical and empirical literature relating to preferences of 
regional actors has proliferated. Consequently, scholars have developed models 
that capture the driving forces and logics behind the trend of the empowerment 
of regions (Bauer, 2006; Bauer, Pitschel, & Studinger, 2010; Gains & John, 
2010; Studinger & Bauer, 2012; Tatham & Bauer, 2014a; 2014b).  
This literature commonly views regionalisation as a consequence of 
subnational and supranational institutional developments, by for instance 
observing regional demands for control over power dispersion, or demands for 
having a greater say on supranational integration measures (Tatham & Bauer, 
2014a; 2014b). However, the actual power to disperse authority away from the 
national level often rests with the national governments themselves (Tatham & 
Bauer, 2016).  
Moreover, the Nordic regionalism debate draws on many similar arguments 
as those in other European countries, which were influenced by a growing 
institutionalisation of regional cooperation and integration since the 1990s. 
Among its core characteristics is an increased focus on the regional level as an 
arena for political decision-making (Baldersheim & Ståhlberg, 1999). To gauge 
the drivers of Norwegian regional bureaucrats’ decentralisation preferences, 
therefore, a set of hypotheses are formed based on logics that have explained 
preference variation in other regions. These hypotheses combine decentralisation 
theory and public administration literature, utilising principles and functional 
aspects from both, to form an overarching view of how we should expect 
regional bureaucrats to respond to decentralisation measures.  
 
Five Expectations  
Descriptively, regional administrative preference literature has usually observed 
support for the status-quo, and no great desires to upend existing institutional 
arrangements and structures of governance. This is also found among Norwegian 







To assess the preferences among regional bureaucrats, the following section 
proposes five central explanatories. These have to do with theoretical and 
political motivations for decentralisation, the bureaucrats’ positions within the 
administrations, and their feelings of regional territorial attachment.  
 
Motivations to Decentralise  
The underlying theoretical reasoning for undertaking subnational territorial and 
administrative reforms is usually focused on increasing both the subnational 
government’s independent decision-making capacity, as well as improving its 
output (public service) quality. As functions are decentralised, it increases the 
autonomy of the subnational level, while public services become more tailored 
and suited to the needs of the citizens at the local levels. These logics largely 
find their origins in the works of Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) (Alibegović & 
Slijepčević, 2016, p. 54). More recently, scholars have operationalised the 
concept of such regional authority by constructing the Regional Authority Index 
(Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2010), in which the region’s self-rule consists not 
only of its competence portfolio, but more generally the regional government’s 
capacities to exercise its authority independently of central government.  
The desire to increase subnational autonomy has been an important driving 
force behind regional reforms across democratic regimes, as the notion of 
subnational autonomy has become a “panacea” – a popular principle of 
governance and a normatively justified policy with little room for criticism – 
since the 1970s (Saito, 2008).  
This relates to the second rationale motivating decentralisation. As they 
become subject to political and administrative management closer to the citizens, 
public services are improved: a rationale drawing on the notion that in order to 
be as efficient and effective as possible, services should be delivered at the 
lowest level possible, so that they become better tailored to the needs of the 
citizens, who are more homogenous in their needs and interests at disaggregated 
levels (Saito, 2008; Tiebout, 1956).  
Both of these motivations were expressed by the reform’s political 
supporters.5 If we then put these arguments to regional bureaucrats as 
motivations to reform the regional level, how do they respond? Following 
general notions of bureaucratic pragmatic thinking (Aberbach, Putnam, & 
Rockman, 1981) and in keeping with the theoretical logics outlined above, we 
should expect that those who consider it important to increase regional autonomy 
– that is, the region’s capacities for independent governance – and to improve 
regional public services, also support decentralisation measures.  
 
H1.a: The more important regional bureaucrats consider increasing regional 
self-rule to be, the greater their desire to allocate competences to the regional 
level.  
 
H1.b: The more important regional bureaucrats consider improving public 
services to be, the greater their desire to allocate competences to the regional 
level.  
 




Professional Motivations  
A central aspect of preference formation theory in the public administration 
literature relates to the professional motivations and self-interests of the 
individual bureaucrat. 
These form important determinants regarding the preferences they have 
and/or decisions they make, be it on the role of government in the economy 
(Tatham & Bauer, 2015), the prospects of job security (Bauer, Pitschel, & 
Studinger, 2010), preferences when the design of their institution is altered 
(Gains & John, 2010) or decision-making behaviour generally (Egeberg & 
Stigen, 2018).  
In other words, a bureaucrat's position is often held as a dominant and 
controlling factor for explaining their attitudes and behaviour (Yoo & Wright, 
1994). These propositions may effectively be summarised in what has become 
known as "Miles' Law": where you stand depends on where you sit (Miles, 
1978), and, when introducing this logic to decentralisation reform, effectively 
incorporates elements of the public choice literature and the budget- maximising 
premise of bureaucracies (Niskanen, 1971). While this premise has been 
challenged, and that senior and high-ranked bureaucrats instead may prefer 
smaller, elite bureaus rather than heading “heavily staffed, large budget but 
routine, conflictual and low status agencies” (Dunleavy, 1991, p. 202), empirical 
observations testing these assumptions among civil servants at the subnational 
level have found that such preferences depend on the type of task they want to 
undertake within the job they have (Gains & John, 2010). Moreover, the jury is 
still out on the explanatory power of these conflicting premises regarding 
subnational bureaucrats facing competence decentralisation.  
The Regional Government Reform involved significant restructuring of the 
regional administrations, both in terms of their geographical location and 
organisational structure. Amalgamating administrative organisations and taking 
on a wider array of responsibilities creates a new “habitus” for the bureaus 
affected, in which individuals will seek to position themselves according to the 
values characterising the social and formal hierarchies within the new and 
enlarged bureaus.6 
In this sense, the impact of structural reforms on the individual bureaucrat 
depends on their ability to navigate and position themselves within the 
administration, which in turn depends on the position they hold prior to the 
reform.  
These logics also lean on the arguments that higher-ranked civil servants (1) 
have more frequent contact with the political sphere of government, and that (2) 
their 'overarching view' of the administration is more ́holistic ́ than that of the 
street-level bureaucrat's, thereby being able to see opportunities for altering or 
widening their institutions’ managerial portfolio. 
These logics may also apply to those without a formally higher rank then 
their colleagues, but with extensive experience in the administration. Based on 
these assumptions, the second set of explanatories tests the professional 







their rank, assuming a relationship with decentralisation preferences in line with 
the budget-maximising model’s premises.  
 
H2.a: The higher the bureaucrat’s seniority, the greater the desire to allocate 
competences to the regional level.  
 
H2.b: The higher the bureaucrat’s rank, the greater the desire to allocate 
competences to the regional level.  
 
Theoretically, we should expect some level of correlation between these two 
factors, as higher- ranked members of the administration may also have greater 
seniority than their lower-ranked colleagues. To address this, issues of 
multicollinearity are empirically tested for in the data section.  
 
Attachment  
The last explanatory relates to the territorial dimension of regionalisation. Long-
established territorially-based communities may create common feelings of 
identity or belonging, which may materialise as feelings of attachment, produced 
and reproduced through discourses relating to the territories and communities in 
question (Terlouw, 2016). This may produce demands for empowerment, 
cultivating a 'rise of regions' (Tatham & Mbaye, 2018).  
This community logic, and its effect on increasing regional authority, may 
arise “because individuals prefer to choose rules who share their 
cultural/linguistic/political norms (...) where regional community is strong, one 
should find more regional authority” (Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2010, p. 65). 
The territorial dimension of subnational empowerment has been documented as 
an important determinant in regionalisation literature, including regional elite 
preferences for competence allocation in the EU system (Tatham & Bauer, 
2016).  
As regional government employees, the regional bureaucrats are also 
members of the territorial communities in which they administrate, implement 
and provide services. Assuming a territorial attachment is present among the 
bureaucrats, this should be further strengthened by the fact that their daily work 
consists of managing and providing services on behalf of the regional level.  
If one is strongly attached to one's territorial jurisdiction, one desires to 
strengthen the relative importance of that territory, in this case, through 
allocating more functions to it at the cost of the central level. Hence, bureaucrats 
strongly attached to the territory in which they administrate and implement 
policy, can be expected to want to increase the regional level’s authority through 
a broadening of its managerial portfolio.   
 
H3 – The stronger the feeling of attachment the bureaucrat has to their county, 
the greater the desire to allocate competences to it.  
 
Data and Research Design  
Original survey data collected between November 2017 and January 2018 
captured a range of observables related to the bureaucrats' reform preferences. 




Through the web-based tool SurveyXact, a total of 3628 county government 
employees in each county, excluding the capital Oslo, received a survey 
consisting of 41 questions by email.7 Of the recipients, 1239 responded in full, 
yielding a total response rate of 34%. Permission for the data collection was 
granted by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data’s Data Protection Services, 
while the administrative leaders in each county were also made aware of the 
survey in advance. Those who had not responded after the initial distribution 
received two reminders at 2-week intervals. As a statistical dataset of reform 
preferences from all of Norway's county administrations, it is the first of its kind 
(Myksvoll, 2018).  
To measure their decentralisation preferences, the respondents were given 
nine points to freely distribute between the local, regional and national 
government levels in nine policy areas (nine points to distribute in agriculture, 
nine points to distribute in climate and environment, and so on; a total of 81 
points).8 The policy areas were chosen based on their prevalence in the reform as 
possible areas where regionalisation could take place.9 They were informed that 
the more points they allocated to a single level, the more it would entail costs 
and financing but also rights and responsibilities within that specific policy area. 
Table 1 summarises the respondent’s point distribution to the regional level, and 
for contextual purposes also includes the number of county councils that desired 
competences within, or broader aspects of, each individual policy area when they 
made their preferences to the government.  
 
Table 1. Summary of dependent variables  
Policy Area Min/Max Mean (SD) Median Desired by (n/17 
counties) 
Agriculture 0/9 3.21 (1.81) 3 12 
Climate and Environment 0/9 3.06 (1.47) 3 17 












Cultural Institutions 0/9 3.57 (1.54) 3 9 
Immigrant Integration 0/9 2.12 (1.37) 2 10 
Regional Planning 0/9 5.9 (1.94) 6 8 
Roads and Transport 0/9 3.82 (1.66) 3 15 
Secondary Education10 0/9 6.62 (2.2) 7 10 
Descriptive summary statistics of regional bureaucrats’ point allocation to the regional level. Nine 
points distributable in each of the policy areas. N = 1239 for all policy areas. 
 
To measure their preferences regarding the importance of increasing regional 
self-rule and improving regional public services, the respondents answered on an 
ordinal scale ranging from 1: "not important" to 5: "very important". The 
position-based variables were captured by the respondents’ seniority in terms of 
years (recoded to decades), while their rank was ordered into three levels: 
consultant/advisor (also known as 'street-level bureaucrat'), middle-management, 
and management. A 10-point scale measured the respondents' feelings of 







Table 2. Summary of central explanatory variables  
Explanatory 
Factor 
Variable Description Min/ 
Max 







How important is increasing 







How important is improving 












How many years have you 














1.31 (0.61) + 
 
Identity To what degree do you feel 







 N = 1239. Control variables reported in supplementary appendix. 
 
To account for other possible causes of regionalisation preference variation, 
controls at both individual and regional levels are included.  
At the individual level, the control variables draw on socialisation literature 
commonly employed in explanatory models in preference formation literature 
(Yoo & Wright, 1994; Tatham & Bauer, 2015; Egeberg & Stigen, 2018). These 
include the bureaucrat's characteristics and background (gender, age, ideological 
self-placement, educational level and pathways), as well as other career 
observables (previous experience in the public and private sectors, and the 
department in which they were employed at the time of the data collection).  
Lastly, the competence transfers constituted one element of the reform, the 
county amalgamations the other. Thus, the bureaucrats’ preferences towards the 
amalgamations are also controlled for.  
Regional level controls include county level demographic, economic and 
geographic variables. Through the logic of scale economic effects, territorial, 
economic and government size of regions is perceived to affect the efficiency 
and capacity the government has to take on responsibilities and tasks (Studinger 
& Bauer, 2012, p. 16; Tatham & Bauer, 2016, p. 2). In this sense, demographic 
and economic variables are measured by county population and GDP/capita.  
The geographical factor is linked to the reform’s amalgamations. Territorial 
consolidation reforms invariably create new centres and peripheries within the 
territories affected. In other words, county amalgamations establish new regional 
capitals at the expense of old centres, now turned peripheries within the new 
region (Lie, 2006, p. 49; 90). As such, the central explanatory variables are also 
controlled for by assessing the status of each pre-amalgamated county as 
constituting either a regional centre or periphery within the new region.  
While the bureaucrats represent their distinct counties, and thus sharing a 
number of (observed and unobserved) characteristics according to their 
geographical placement, empirically testing the level of regional clustering 
among the bureaucrats in each policy area reveals low levels (mean = .012, max 
= .03 in the empty models) of intraclass correlation. In other words, on average, 
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regional clustering only accounts for 1.2% of point allocation variance among 
the respondents. Hence, the bureaucrats' point allocation is analysed in two 
single level linear OLS- regression models: (1) a 'rudimentary' model, where 
only the central variables of interest are included (n = 1239), and (2) a model 
with 30 individual and regional level controls added (n = 1114).  
Given the number of variables, the data was tested for possible issues of 
multicollinearity. The variance inflation factor for the full models returned 
overall (mean = 1.41) and individual (max = 2.73) values in all nine policy areas 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem when running the proposed 
models in any of them.  
 
Results  
Figure 1 displays the bureaucrats’ point allocation to the regional level in the 
nine policy areas. Across all areas, the point distribution averages just above 4. 
Clustering their point allocation around the 3-4-point range in most of the policy 
areas, the regional bureaucrats display no great desire to empower the regional 
level in policy areas for which they are not already responsible. This shows as 
Secondary Education and Regional Planning tops the point distribution with 6.6 
and 5.8 points, respectively, forming significant outliers in the point allocation, 
whilst also displaying a more even distribution rather than being heavily 
clustered around a single point.  
 
Figure 1. Regional bureaucrats’ point allocation to the regional level  
Beanplot of regional bureaucrats’ point allocation to the regional level in descending order. Dashed 
line represents overall mean, solid lines represent individual means. Larger “beans” represent higher 
densities. X-axis denotes points allocated by the regional bureaucrats. N = 1239.  
 
It is important to note that these two are policy areas in which the county 
governments already have a relatively high number of responsibilities; as such, 
while they significantly differ from the rest, this is not surprising when 
considering the overall impression that the bureaucrats prefer a (pre-reform) 







The lower point allocation in Roads and Transport, which is the second 
most important area for the counties, could be explained as a manifestation of 
desiring specific tasks within the area, rather than a desire for a “complete 
takeover”. The wider distribution of points on the two most highly desired areas 
may also suggest a difference of opinion between desiring new competences and 
merely retaining what they already have.  
The distribution of points in the various policies reveals varying degrees of 
congruence. Immigrant Integration clusters around 3 points, but a considerable 
number of bureaucrats have allocated fewer points, while very few have gone 
above, making this the policy area least desired by the bureaucrats. In between 
this and the two top outliers, we see that the bureaucrats have largely clustered 
their point distribution around the 3-4-point range, though the allocation skews 
mostly upwards, (Cultural Grants, Roads and Transport, Community 
Development, Cultural Institutions), suggesting that a significant amount of 
bureaucrats are positive to receiving additional tasks in these areas, while two 
(Agriculture and Climate and Environment) are more normally distributed 
around the 3-point cluster.  
Agriculture and Climate and Environment are interesting cases as a number 
of tasks within them are located at the County Governor, a county-level central 
government institution. Hence, a transfer of tasks within these areas is a more 
complicated matter, as they would entail institutional decentralisation, but not, in 
the strictest sense, regionalisation, as they would move from one regional 
authority to another. Whether the bureaucrats’ point allocation reflects this is 
uncertain.  
Overall, figure 1 presents a picture of somewhat reserved regional 
bureaucrats; policy areas already located at the regional level are desired kept (or 
expanded), while other policy areas are looked on with some reservation – 
though not without differences of opinion.  
 
Drivers of competence desires  
Addressing the drivers of their point allocation, the bureaucrats’ preferences are 
primarily driven by the “increasing self-rule” argument. In every policy area, 
those perceiving it important to increase regional autonomy are more positive 
towards regionalising competences. Following this, we see that stronger feelings 
of county attachment increases point allocation in just over half of the policies 
(Secondary Education, Roads and Transport, Community Development, Climate 
and Environment, and Immigrant Integration).  
The higher the bureaucrat’s rank, the more positive they are towards 
increasing regional decision-making responsibilities in over half over the policy 
areas, though this depends on the presence of control variables in certain cases 
(Secondary Education, Regional Planning, Cultural Grants, Roads and 
Transport when controls are introduced, and Agriculture when they are not).  
Just behind in prevalence, the seniority of the bureaucrats affects their point 
allocation in under half of the policies (Secondary Education, Regional Planning 
when controls are omitted, Roads and Transport, and Immigrant Integration). 
This is also the only instance in which we observe a negative effect. The greater 
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the bureaucrats’ seniority, the less they desire regional responsibility of 
immigrant integration measures.  
Finally, although valued highly by the bureaucrats (mean 4,53 / 5), the 
importance of improving public services at the regional level does not 
significantly affect any policy areas, except in the case of Secondary Education.  
 
Figure 2. Effects of central explanatory variables on regional bureaucrats’ 
regionalisation preferences  
OLS-regression of central explanatory variables on bureaucrats’ point allocation in nine policy areas. 
Central explanatories tested in two models: (1) a “Rudimentary” model (N = 1239 in all policy 
areas), containing only the central explanatories and (2) a “Controls” model (N = 1114 in all policy 
areas), which includes all 30 regional and individual level controls. Policy areas ordered in 
descending prevalence (left-right, top-bottom) according to the bureaucrats’ point allocation in figure 
1; regression coefficients on the x-axes; 95% confidence intervals displayed.  
 
Given the number of dependent variables and the central explanatory 
variables’ varying effects, it makes more sense to evaluate the hypotheses in a 
scale-like manner rather than dichotomously rejecting or failing to reject the null 
hypotheses. On one end of this scale, we see that H1.a is confirmed in all cases, 
while at the other end H1.b is mostly rejected, except in the case of Secondary 
Education. In between these extremes, H2.a, H2.b and H3 are rejected (or 
confirmed) to various degrees, depending on the policy. 
  
Principled or Functional Autonomy?  
The bureaucrats’ perceived feelings of the importance to increase regional 
autonomy matters most to their desires to regionalise competences. This 
explanatory shows the most consistent and highest degree of influence on the 
bureaucrats’ allocation of points to the regional rather than the local and national 
levels. However, its direct effects on the dependent variables cannot explain the 
type of correlation we are seeing.  
The theoretical foundation for this explanatory variable is intricately linked 







efficiency in administrating and delivering services (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; 
Saito, 2008; Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2010). Adding to this the broadly 
accepted view in public administration literature that though they are not 
completely separated from the sphere of policy-making as earlier theory posited 
(Demir & Nyhan, 2008), bureaucrats are, through the necessity of their jobs, 
more pragmatically-than-ideologically thinking (Aberbach, Putnam, & 
Rockman, 1981). Combining decentralisation theory and public administration 
literature leads to an assumption that bureaucrats may support increasing levels 
of regional autonomy not necessarily as a principally valued good in and of 
itself, but rather as a function to achieve government effectiveness.  
In other words, greater regional autonomy could be held as a means to an 
end; the assumption being that with greater autonomy comes greater 
effectiveness and improved services.  
A way of empirically testing this assumption with the available data is 
through a series of two- way interaction regressions. These were run with the 
increased autonomy and improving services variables on the full models. 
Assessing if increased autonomy was seen a means to achieving improved 
service quality, the latter’s effect on the point allocation was observed at the 
different values of the former. In none of the policies did it produce a significant 
change in the effect observed in figure 2, leaving the improved services variable 
non-significant (except in the Secondary Education case). This indicates that the 
bureaucrats are treating the two notions more independently than the underlying 
theory holds, suggesting that the regional bureaucrats view the autonomy 
argument as a determining factor on its own rather than as a function to achieve 
something else. The results of the interaction regression can only indicate, 
however, as there is a lack of overlap between those who strongly desire 
autonomy but do not at all desire to improve services. Controlling for this still 
gives an indication that an interaction between the two is not taking place.  
Where increasing subnational autonomy through decentralisation has 
become a regarded as a normatively justified policy in and of itself (Saito, 2008), 
it may also be motivated through a desire to increase the importance and status 
of the regional territories. Indeed, the regional empowerment that have taken 
place the last few decades has been explained as a result of increased subnational 
pressures, driven in part by identity and community logics (Tatham & Mbaye, 
2018). The observations in figure 2 and the lack of any significant interactions 
between the autonomy and services arguments disentangles the observed effects 
from a functional attitude among the bureaucrats, suggesting instead a principled 
one. This is further strengthened with the second most prevalent finding in the 
discussion: that higher degrees of regional attachment (sometimes) increases 
support for regionalising competences.  
 
A Moderately Identity-Driven Desire  
The identity and community-driven logics that have accounted for 
regionalisation pressures in a range of democratic polities is visible to some 
extent among the bureaucrats as well. Their county attachment does increase 




support for competence regionalisation in several policies, though where there is 
a significant effect, its substantive size is somewhat moderate.  
While the level of county attachment is relatively high among the 
bureaucrats (see table 1), the general level of regional territorial sentiment is 
comparatively weaker in Norway than in other European countries. Although 
calls for a ‘Nordic regionalism’ debate have been made (Baldersheim & 
Ståhlberg, 1999), community attachments in Norway is predominantly found at 
the local rather than the regional level (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010; Flo, 2015). 
This may help to explain the moderate effects we are seeing. Despite this, it 
should not be ignored as an explanatory factor, being the second most prevalent 
driver of the bureaucrats’ regionalisation preferences.  
 
Carefully optimistic elites  
The bureaucrats’ rank in the administrations does in some cases lead to increased 
support for regionalising competences. While the effect is robust independent of 
controls in Regional Planning, Secondary Education and Cultural Grant 
Management, its effect only becomes significant through controlling factors in 
Roads and Transport and is oppositely moderated towards non-significance in 
Agriculture.  
Thought supported by the budget-maximising model’s premises, the 
underlying logic behind administrative elites being positive towards increasing 
regional responsibilities could be explained by somewhat different dynamics:  
 
1. Widening managerial responsibilities leads to a feeling of increased 
status. Administrative elites, overseeing the responsibilities and 
provisions of the services and implementations of policies thus get a 
greater say on the government's functions and have opportunities to 
become, or stay, highly placed in the post- reform bureau’s new 
habitus.  
2. As elites, placed in the higher echelons of the administrative 
institutions, they have more frequent contact with politicians than the 
street-level bureaucrat. They also have a more ‘holistic’ view of their 
departments or institution, and as such could argue through functional 
necessity the need for additional competences. As they may not deem 
every policy area functionally necessary to regionalise, it could explain 
why some of the policy areas are affected and others are not.  
 
To gauge the bureaucrats’ task preferences in a more detailed manner, the 
survey also included an open-ended response option in which they could 
describe tasks and functions they desired at the regional level more explicitly. To 
address whether the effects of rank on point allocation was explained by 
motivations related to increased status or functional necessity, their open 
responses were compared across their ranks.  
The bureaucrats do not display a substantial difference across the three 







mention, and the arguments they make, generally pointing towards functional 
necessity.  
If we then treat their regionalisation justifications as a constant, yet the elites 
appear more positive in certain areas, the explanation may be found elsewhere, 
such as personal self-interest through increased status. The research design limits 
us from fully capturing this rationale, however, as the survey did not include 
questions relating to the bureaucrats’ job motivations (and few would openly 
admit to being motivated by personal status and self-interest). Hence, the 
assumption that this finding is due to self-interests is mostly based on inductive 
inference, while our empirical observations point to a regionalisation 
justification based on functional necessity. Our understanding of the rank-effect 
is then perhaps best explained by returning to the overall picture of the 
bureaucrats’ preferences.  
 
Reserved but Principled (and Sometimes Functional)  
For the bureaucrats to empower the regional level, the perceived importance of 
increasing regional autonomy matters most. 
While the theoretical underpinning for this relation is interlinked with the 
regional governments’ effectiveness, empirically testing this has revealed a more 
principled thinking among the bureaucrats than initially assumed.  
This also relates to the community and identity logics observed in other 
regional preference studies, and the bureaucrats’ attachment to their counties 
indeed plays a role when the bureaucrats distribute their points to the regional 
level, though to a lesser extent.  
Following the principles and identity-based justifications for 
decentralisation, the bureaucrats’ positions also matter somewhat, as higher-
ranked officials are more positive to regionalising competences in certain areas, 
though their seniority rarely affects their preferences, and represents the only 
case in which we observe a negative effect.  
The perceived importance of improving regional public services does not 
matter, neither directly as a cause of regionalisation desires, nor when treated as 
a functional end reached through increased levels of self-rule. This is interesting, 
as it conflicts with some theoretical assumptions of decentralisation and public 
administration theories. As the theoretical linkage between the two arguments 
fails to materialise empirically, the Norwegian regional bureaucrats instead seem 
to view increased autonomy as a desirable outcome in and of itself rather than as 
a function to improve public service qualities at the regional level. This leaves us 
with a picture of regional bureaucrats more driven by principles of governance 
and identity-logics rather than arguments pertaining to functional pressures, 
effects, and pragmaticism, challenging aspects of decentralisation theories and 
notions of bureaucratic thinking.  
 
Conclusions  
Since 1950, the regional level has gradually increased its importance across 
democratic regimes. Subnational demands for regional empowerment have often 
driven this process. This has not been the case in Norway. Leaving out 




subnational community pressures as a force for regionalisation, the underlying 
rationales for undertaking regional reforms are, however, similar to those found 
in other countries. As direct stakeholders of regionalisation, this article has 
explored the regionalisation preferences among Norwegian regional bureaucrats 
in context of the 2015-2020 Norwegian Regional Government Reform.  
A continuous strand in the public administration literature is to understand 
and explain the behaviour and preferences of bureaucrats (Egeberg & Stigen, 
2018). Contributing to this literature, the aim of this article has been to explore 
the drivers of regional bureaucrats’ regionalisation preferences, addressing how 
various dynamics affect them based on a combination of decentralisation theory 
and public administration literature.  
A historic alteration of the regional level, the Norwegian Regional 
Government Reform amalgamated counties and transferred a set of functions to 
the regional governments. To examine the regional bureaucrats’ attitudes 
towards this process, an original survey captured and measured a range of 
observables related to their desires for increasing the scope of regional 
responsibilities.  
Generally, the bureaucrats do not display a great eagerness to regionalise 
competences. Instead, the pre-reform arrangement of competence placement 
seems most desirable. Where the bureaucrats desire more functions to the 
regional level, they are primarily driven by governance principles and 
community logics, less so by arguments relating to functional effects and 
pressures.  
For the bureaucrats to support widening responsibilities at the regional level, 
their desire to increase the level of regional autonomy matters most, being 
consistently and positively related with the allocation of competences to the 
regional level. 
This explanatory factor serves as a more independent dynamic than the 
theoretical foundations for it would suggest. Although the bureaucrats feel it is 
important to improve the quality of the services they provide, it does not 
influence their desires to regionalise more responsibilities to the regional 
governments. This is somewhat surprising, as the notions of increased autonomy 
and improved services are theoretically linked. Testing this linkage empirically, 
however, shows that the effect of the “improved services” argument remains 
insignificant across all levels of desires for increased autonomy. This indicates a 
more principled approach rather than a functional line of thinking among the 
bureaucrats than is assumed in both decentralisation theory and broader public 
administration literature.  
It is, however, supported by the second most prevalent finding. Playing into 
the same dynamics as a desire to increase regional autonomy, the bureaucrats’ 
feeling of regional attachment also increases support for regionalising 
competences, though to a somewhat lesser extent. Taken together, we therefore 
see a strong explanation for regional administrative decentralisation preferences 
from principles and valued norms held by the bureaucrats.  
Functional explanations for desiring competence regionalisation are more 







administrations sometimes, though to a lesser extent, support regionalising 
competences within certain policy areas, but also represent the only case of a 
negative effect.  
This is not to say that these types of explanations don’t matter. Higher 
ranked and more senior bureaucrats can be expected to have some knowledge of 
which competences could – or should – be transferred to the regional level. We 
do not fully know, however, whether these explanatories capture the desire for 
increased responsibilities due to purely functional necessity or professional self-
interest, though empirical observations through open-ended responses suggest 
the former. However, these responses do not vary distinctly from their lower 
ranked colleagues; as such the validity of assuming that a purely functional and 
not personal motivation-based argument lies behind these explanatories may be 
debatable, as a widened managerial portfolio also may invoke a feeling of 
increased personal status within the new regional administrations.  
Having explored various drivers of decentralisation preferences among 
regional bureaucrats, the findings in this article have shed light on a “principle-
functional” dynamic, showing how, when faced with decentralisation measures, 
regional bureaucrats are driven by the former to a larger extent than the latter. 
This finding challenges some notions of bureaucratic functional thinking, and 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of control variables 
Variable N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Gender 1239 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 
Age 1239 48.88 10.21 22 49 69 
Left-Right Ideological 
Self-Placement 1149 2.49 1.30 1 2 5 
Education: Level 1239 4.65 0.77 1 5 6 
Education: Oslo 1239 1.45 0.73 1 1 3 
Education: Law 1239 0.06 0.24 0 0 1 
Education: Economy 1239 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 
Education: Social Sciences 1239 0.30 0.46 0 0 1 
Education: Humanities 1239 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 
Education: Natural 
Sciences 1239 0.16 0.37 0 0 1 
Job Experience Outside 
Public Sector 1238 0.71 0.46 0 1 1 
Has Worked: Central State 1239 0.18 0.38 0 0 1 
Has Worked: Regional 
State 1239 0.20 0.40 0 0 1 
Has Worked: Local State 1239 0.05 0.23 0 0 1 
Previous Employment in 
Local Government 1239 0.42 0.49 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Planning 1239 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Economy 1239 0.12 0.33 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Legal Service 1239 0.03 0.16 0 0 1 
Current Employment: IT 1239 0.06 0.25 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Culture 1239 0.17 0.38 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Enterprise/Industry 1239 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Regional Development 1239 0.20 0.40 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Education 1239 0.16 0.36 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Traffic 1239 0.06 0.24 0 0 1 
Current Employment: 
Environment 1239 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 
Stance: Forced 
Amalgamations 1211 2.46 1.37 1 2 5 
Stance: Voluntary 
Amalgamations 1218 3.80 1.17 1 4 5 
Population 1239 293,549.63 1.61e+05 76,149 247,084 604,368 
GDP per Capita 1239 398.48 57.81 311 396 528 
County Status: 























































Correlation matrix of central independent variables. Correlation coefficients with significance levels 
in brackets. 
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* p<0.05 , ** 
p<0.01,  *** 
p<0.001  
               
OLS-regression tables of figure 2 in paper. R = Rudimentary model; C = Controls model. Linear regression models of all nine policy 
areas. Non-significant effects omitted; t statistics in parentheses. 
LR Ideology: Left-Right Ideological Self-Placement; Edu: SS = Education: Social Sciences; Edu: Hum = Education: Humanities; Emp. 
Plan = Current Employment: Planning; Emp. Culture = Current Employment: Culture; Emp. Reg Dev = Current Employment: 
Regional Development; Emp. Edu = Current Employment: Education; Emp: Traffic = Current Employment: Traffic; Emp. Env = 
Current Employment: Environment; Prev. Emp: Local Gov = Previous Employment in Local Government 
 
Sector Dimensionality 
The policy areas were chosen based on their prevalence in the reform. We 
should theoretically expect them to correlate to a certain extent, as they all relate 
to policy regionalisation. As table A3 shows, this is indeed the case. To explore 
this, an analysis of the central independent variables was rerun with a simple 








Table A5. Regression analysis of central explanatory and control variables on 
regionalisation index dependent variable 
Variable Rudimentary Controls 
Increasing Autonomy 0.29*** 0.28*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Improving Services 0.08* 0.08* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Seniority 0.06*  
 (0.03)  
Rank 0.16*** 0.164*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Attachment 0.06*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Left-Right Ideological Self-Placement -0.07*** 
  (0.02) 
Edu: SS 0.19*** 
  (0.07) 
Has Worked: Central State -0.14* 
  (0.08) 
Prev. Emp.: Local Gov. -0.13** 
  (0.06) 
Emp. LS 0.33* 
  (0.20) 
Emp. Culture -0.15* 
  (0.09) 
Emp. Reg. Dev. 0.14* 
  (0.08) 
Emp. Edu -0.36*** 
  (0.08) 
Emp. Traffic -0.20* 
  (0.12) 
Stance: Voluntary Amalgamations 0.046* 
  (0.03) 
County Status: Centre/Periphery -0.19** 
  (0.08) 
Constant 1.739*** 1.67*** 
 (0.19) (0.43) 
N 1,239 1,114 
R-squared 0.14 0.21 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
OLS-regression tables of independent variables effects on regionalisation index based on the nine 
policy area variables. Non-significant effects omitted; standard error in parenteses. 
Edu: SS = Education: Social Sciences; Emp. LS = Current Employment: Legal Service; Emp. 
Culture = Current Employment: Culture; Emp. Reg. Dev. = Current Employment: Regional 
Development; Emp. Edu = Current Employment: Education; Emp. Traffic = Current Employment: 
Traffic; Prev. Emp.: Local Gov. = Previous Employment in Local Government. 
 
Overall, the effects do not significantly alter the paper’s conclusions. A desire 
for increased autonomy still strongly affects their regionalisation preferences, 
while rank and attachment also do so, though to lesser extents. 
In addition to a simple additive index analysis, a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test 
was run to determine whether the policy areas could be broken into 
distinguishable underlying categories. Returning a value of 0.84, this test 








Table A6. Explorative factor analysis of the nine policy areas (2-factor solution) 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Regional Planning 0.7602  
Agriculture  0.5260 
Immigrant Integration  0.8198 
Cultural Grants 0.6839  
Cultural Institutions 0.5803  
Roads and Transport 0.6582  
Climate and Environment 0.4692  
Secondary Education 0.6538  
Community Development 0.6502  
Variance explained (%) 34 16 
Cronbach’s α 0.77 0.32 
Notes: Factor analysis, 2 factors with eigenvalues over 1. 
Analysis run specifying 2 factors after initial explorative 
analysis. Factor loadings > 0.4 omitted. 
Factor correlation Factor 1 Factor 2 
Factor 1 0.9422 0.3351 
Factor 2 -0.3351 0.9422 
 
The principal factor analysis returned nine components, with the two first 
displaying eigenvalues > 1 (3,3 and 1,2, respectively). They accounted for 
cumulatively 50% of the variance (37% and 14% respectively). Hence, a two-
factor solution was chosen. 
Although omitting factor loadings below 0.4, the initial two-factor solution 
returned some overlap between the two factors. This was the case in agriculture 
(0.41 and 0.53 loadings in factors 1 and 2, respectively), and Climate and 
Environment (0.47 and 0.44 in factors 1 and 2, respectively). To “clean” the 
factors, the lowest values of the two were omitted. Factor 1 thus retains seven of 
the policy areas, while factor 2 only consists of two.  
Testing the internal consistency of the two factors reveals low levels of 
reliability, with Cronbach’s alpha values of 0.77 and 0.32, suggesting the factors 
are somewhat heterogeneous. Theoretically, the nine policy areas could be 
viewed as pertaining to national or regional/local matters. The heterogeneous 
nature of the two factors weakens this suspicion, however, and no further 




















1 See Lie (2006) and Blindheim (2013) for regional political preferences towards future 
county structures and competences. Moreover, research projects ongoing (as of 2020) are 
collecting data on politicians’ and citizens’ views on the reform, while non-academic 
documentation refers to a large body of media coverage and public debates relating to the 
reform.  
2 In the 1970s, a nation-wide reform established directly elected regional representatives 
and their administrations, though did not specify the functions they would receive. The 
regional level's portfolio was since periodically debated, and while some minor reforms 
have taken place, large-scale territorial reforms prior to 2020 failed to materialise (Blom-
Hansen, Christiansen, Fimreite, & Selle, 2012; Flo, 2004; Selstad, 2003).  
3 While some counties expressed a desire to ‘retake’ the hospitals in the reform, this never 
became a realistic part of the political discussion. 
4 See government-appointed committee’s report “Decentralization of tasks from the state 
to the counties” (2018, p. 23) for a more detailed summary. 
5 Supporters of the reform frequently made use of these arguments in various discourses 
and debates. Additionally, the 2013-2017 Liberal and Christian Democratic parties’ 
manifestos make arguments pertaining to increased autonomy and improved services. 
When the two parties entered government in 2018 and 2019 respectively, these same 
arguments were also included in the expanded government declarations.  
6 See Bourdieu (1996) for a detailed discussion of how cultural and economic hierarchy 
systems affect group dynamics within the habitus (or social space).  
7 Oslo is classified as both a municipality and a county. Hence, there is no separate 
regional administration, as local government institutions also undertake county 
responsibilities.  
8 A method mirroring the design of Tatham and Bauer (2016).  
9 Although the overall debate during the reform’s process provided some of the policy 
selection, the primary source was the county government’s letters to the central 
government which outlined the policies and responsibilities they desired, sourced from 
the counties’ websites. 
10Although secondary education was an existing and important area of responsibility for 
the counties pre-reform, several of the tasks transferred in the reform have to do with 
"competence" – that is, tasks relating to adult training, education for immigrants, job 
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